本文旨在探討在盈餘門檻下,研發支出及資本支出是否存在替代性,並進一步檢視董監事責任險(Directors’ and Officer’s Liability Insurance, D O責任險)之投保對於前述替代性之影響,本研究以2013年至2018年我國上市櫃之電子工業公司為樣本,並以兩階段最小平方法(2SLS)進行檢視。 本研究之實證結果顯示,在盈餘門檻下,研發支出會減少而資本支出會增加,且在敏感性分析中總投資支出(研發支出加資本支出)並未因盈餘門檻而有顯著差異,亦即平均而言在盈餘門檻下研發支出之減少伴隨資本支出之上升,此外,在敏感性分析中皆獲得穩健支持。進一步檢視D O責任險之交互作用發現,相較於未投保D O 責任險之公司,投保D O責任險之公司在盈餘門檻下仍會降低研發支出,但資本支出上升情形減緩,亦即研發支出與資本支出之替代性下降,支持D O責任險經理人機會主義假說。
The thesis explores whether there is the trade-off between R D expenses and capital expenditures under earnings thresholds. Further analysis examines whether directors’ and officer’s (D O) liability insurance affects the trade-off relationship. The thesis analyzes the publicly listed firms in Taiwan electronics industry during the period from 2013 to 2018. Furthermore, the thesis uses the two-stage least squares (2SLS) to examine the results. The empirical results show that R D expenses decrease and capital expenditures increases under earnings thresholds. However, the total investments (R D expenses plus capital expenditures) do not vary under earnings thresholds. This implies, on average, the reduction in R D expenses and the increase in capital expenditures occur concurrently. Also, the results remain valid under sensitivity analysis. Therefore, there is the trade-off between R D expenses and capital expenditures under earnings thresholds. Further analysis examines whether D O insurance affects the trade-off between R D expenses and capital expenditures under earnings thresholds. The empirical results show that, compared to firms without D O insurance, firms purchasing D O insurance would still reduce R D expenses but increase capital expenditures less under earnings thresholds. This implies that the trade-off relationship between R D expenses and capital expenditures is weakened for the firms purchasing D O insurance, supporting the managerial opportunism argument.