布希政府對北韓及伊朗核武危機之政策差異分析—攻勢現實主義的檢視

Analyzing Bush Administration's Policy Difference toward the Nuclear Crises of North Korea and Iran — An Offensive Realist Perspective

謝瀚輝(Han-Hui Hsieh)

指導教授 ： 楊永明

共同指導教授 ： 蔡政文(Cheng-Wen Tsai)

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/碩士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2012.01582

摘要

自2002年以來因北韓及伊朗兩國的核子計畫所引發的新一波核武擴散危機中，美國做為國際關係體系最有影響力及最重要的行為者，對於北韓及伊朗兩國有意圖發展核武的相同指控，亦將兩國定位為邪惡軸心及支持恐怖主義國家。然而在北韓及伊朗核武危機兩案例的背景有許多相似之處的情況下，布希政府對於兩者所採行之政策卻各不相同。布希政府的政策差異為對北韓核武危機採接觸談判並在六方會談中提供北韓合作的誘因，以交換北韓不擴散其核子武器，然而其對於伊朗核武危機的立場則是始終維持強硬態度，不願對伊朗展開談判或在提煉濃縮鈾之立場上讓步，且對伊朗文攻武嚇，施加嚴格制裁。在北韓與伊朗兩案例皆為核武擴散問題且布希政府對兩國之定位及指控相似的狀況下，本文探討的核心問題為，是什麼樣的實際因素與思維邏輯使布希政府對兩者的立場與態度極為不同並使其政策出現顯著差異？為解釋布希政府如此的政策差異，本研究透過攻勢現實主義理論所提出之大國行為邏輯分析美國的政策思維後發現，由於美國係國際關係體系中唯一成功的區域霸權，其身為離岸平衡手，在面對北韓及伊朗核武擴散的危機時，由於布希政府對兩者分別對美國霸權所具威脅性的評估不同，因而採取不同的策略應對。此外，在以核子武器之有無、發展核武之動機、與恐怖主義之關聯，以及區域政治與大國關係等四大變項分析北韓及伊朗核武危機後，布希政府認為伊朗的案例對美國國家安全所具之威脅性較為實際，因此必須以更為強硬的手段處理此問題。而被稱為霸權主義者的布希政府，其政策思維在依循攻勢現實主義之邏輯下，處理北韓核武危機時採取談判妥協，但對伊朗核武危機施加強硬制裁之政策差異原因在於，擁有核武但並非大國的北韓因未對美國之霸權地位有所威脅，因此布希政府選擇以卸責的方式使東北亞地區各國，特別是本地的潛在區域霸權候選者中國處理此一事件。而欲發展核武的伊朗則是一個尋求排除美國勢力成為區域霸權的地區大國，美國必須扮演離岸平衡手的角色在中東維持權力均勢並壓制潛在挑戰者伊朗一旦取得核武的嚴重威脅。基於對北韓及伊朗核武危機對美國國家安全以及霸權地位所具威脅性之評估有所不同，布希政府所採取的政策因而有所差異。

關鍵字

布希政府 ； 北韓 ； 伊朗 ； 核武危機 ； 美國外交政策 ； 攻勢現實主義

並列摘要

Since the nuclear crises of North Korea and Iran broke out in 2002, the U.S. has accused the two countries of attempting to develop nuclear weapons, and listed both as Axis of Evil as well as state sponsors of terrorism. Though same accusations were brought against both North Korea and Iran, the Bush Administration adopted very different policies when dealing with the two cases respectively. American policies were different in that the Bush Administration offered to negotiate with North Korea through the Six-Party Talks and provided incentives in exchange for Pyongyang’s not proliferating its nuclear weapons, yet when facing Iran, the U.S. retained its firm stance on the freezing of Tehran’s uranium enrichment program, refused to commence negotiation with Iran, and imposed strict sanctions against the regime.
Under the circumstance that both North Korea and Iran were accused of breaching the NPT and categorized as enemy states of the U.S., the core question this thesis seeks to answer is: what elements and logic contributed to such significant difference in the policies of the Bush Administration in handling two similar nuclear proliferation crises? In order to answer the proposed research question properly, this thesis applies offensive realism as analytical framework and argues that the underlying logic of such U.S. policy difference is that America, the sole successful regional hegemon in the international system, as an offshore balancer, when facing the nuclear crises involving North Korea and Iran, adopted different policies according to its distinct assessment of the potential threat the two cases possessed respectively to its hegemony.
Furthermore, after examining the two cases with regard to four different variables, including possession of nuclear weapons, motivation of developing nuclear weapons, connection with terrorism, and structure of regional international relations system, the Bush Administration came to the conclusion that Iran’s nuclear crisis represented a far more serious threat than that of North Korea, hence adopted tougher policies to suppress Iran.
In conclusion, the reason why the Bush Administration, which was considered to have a hegemonist foreign policy approach, negotiated with and compromised on North Korea’s proliferation issue while remained unyielding and imposed strict sanctions on Iran’s nuclear crisis could be reasonably explained by the logic of offensive realism. The Bush Administration did not consider nuclear-armed North Korea as a potential threat to American hegemony, therefore chose to buck-pass this issue to local powers in Northeast Asia, particularly to China, its potential peer competitor. On the other hand, the nuclear-seeking Iran is a regional power attempting to expel American presence and seeking dominance over the Middle East, the U.S., as an offshore balancer, must maintain a balancing approach to suppress the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear crisis. Based on the distinct assessments regarding the perceived threat to U.S. national security and hegemony resulted from the nuclear crises of North Korea and Iran respectively, the Bush Administration adopted different policies in dealing with the two cases accordingly.

並列關鍵字

Bush Administration ； North Korea ； Iran ； nuclear crisis ； U.S. foreign policy ； offensive realism

參考文獻

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楊永明，2004，〈國際限武裁軍機制與規範：國際關係理論與國際法規範之檢驗〉，《問題與研究》，43(3) : 77-96。

Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute on International Studies. http://cns.miis.edu