排放權核配方式對產業經濟與環境效率之研究

The Study of Variance Allowance Allocation rule for Industrials’ Economic and Environmental efficiency

官雲卿(Yun-Ching Kuan)

指導教授 ： 李堅明

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/自然資源與環境管理研究所/碩士(2008年)

摘要

爲瞭解不同排放權核配方式之優劣，藉以提出客觀的核配建議，本研究調查台灣能源密集產業利害關係人對實施排放交易制度之態度發現，約七成受訪者希望以混合拍賣之方式核配排放權。透過理論模型評估溯往原則、效率標竿原則和混合拍賣等主要的排放權核配方式在經濟效率、環境有效性與產業競爭力三項政策評估準則之表現，獲得本研究結果如下：
1.市場需求彈性與排放權價格愈高時，高排放係數廠商競爭力之負面衝擊效果愈大。
2.在排放權核配時，政府參酌廠商之防制量來核配排放權，且防制量愈多，核配愈多排放權，將能有效提高廠商之防制誘因。
3.在效率標竿值足夠嚴格(或足夠低)，且拍賣比例足夠高之前提下，本文研究發現，混合拍賣原則之綜合績效最佳。

關鍵字

溯往原則 ； 效率標竿 ； 經濟效率 ； 環境有效性 ； 產業競爭力

並列摘要

In order to understand the pros and cons of variance allowance allocation rule (i.e. grandfathering, benchmark and auctioning mixed allocation rule), we surveyed the stakeholders’ attitude with regard to implement Emission Trading Scheme in Taiwan. We found that almost 70% people more like auctioning mixes allocation principle than other two allocation methods. Furthermore, the study used three performance criteria, such as economic efficiency、environmental effectiveness as well as competition, compared performance on above three allocation methods. Analytical results are as follows:
1.If both price elasticity and allowance price were high enough, then a firm which have high emission factor will result in larger negative competition impact.
2.If government allocated allowance amount could linkage with abatement effort by the firms, which would courage to do more abatement by the firm.
3.Under stricter benchmark standard and higher auction ratio conditions, the study found auctioning mixed allowances allocation rule could achieve the highest performance than other two allocation methods.

並列關鍵字

Grandfathering rule ； Benchmark ； Economic efficiency ； Environmental effectiveness ； Industrial competitiveness

參考文獻

黃宗煌、李堅明(2001)，排放交易、廠商最適投資決策及經濟成長，農業經濟半年刊，民國90年，70：1-35。

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Damien D. and P. Quirion (2006), ‘‘CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European cement industry under the EU ETS: grandfathering versus output-based allocation’’, Climate Policy, 6, 93-113.

Defra, (2006), ‘‘Appraisal of Years 1-4 of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme’’.

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