本文指出,描述性的心理學在對人類道德行為型態的處理上,其實從一開始就逾越哲學的邊界,而柯爾堡試圖訴諸於倫理學的形式主義以逃避此一問題的作法,是不能成立的。瑞琪•亨利則進一步把道德行為的心理動力面向與柯爾堡的概念結合在一起。本文雖肯定柯爾堡的重要貢獻,但也批判柯爾堡僅採取方法論反思的不足;其次指出其心理學背後的意識型態因素;最後則在治療意義上提出補救方案:放棄對心理生活及其條件或效果進行描述工作。作者提出一種新的心理學的提案,首先認定心理學家與其研究對象的關係,此一對象也就是作為主體(或似主體)的人;其次,是來自言說的可能性。描述,無論是本人所作的描述或是第三者所作的描述,都會被言說的互動所取代。作者提議一種互動主義的概念框架,在其中,柯爾堡與瑞琪•亨利的理論可獲取不同的語言遊戲的地位。
This article attempts to demonstrate that the descriptive psychology, in its treatment of ethical problems, seems to have transgressed the boundary line against philosophy. This problematic situation cannot be circumvented by resorting to an ethical formalism-as L. Kohlberg does in his research program. Rachael M. Henry pushes one step forward to tie the psychodynamic aspect of moral behavior with Kohlberg's concept. The present author, all in affirming the important contribution of Kohlberg to psychology, indicates the insufficiency of a mere reflection of methods in Kohlberg's works. Then he dissects the ideologemes behind Kohlberg's psychology. At last he suggests a therapeutic proposal: the demand for describing psychic life, its conditions or effects, shall be dropped. The author proposes instead a program of new psychology that derives first from the relation of psychologist to his object, the human as subject; and second, from the possibilities of speech in communicative interaction. Description, whether made by oneself or by a third person, shall be substituted by speech interactions. These interactions are considered as successful when the partners in a discussion declare themselves to be understood. Within the framework of this interactionist concept, Kohlberg's and Rachael M. Henry's theories could assume the status of various language-games.