政府於特許公司進度落後行使介入權之對策機制：以高雄捷運為例

一般而言，政府控管特許公司之施工進度，除了可藉由發包之評選、特許合約之簽訂以及專業技術服務之委託外，亦可依促參法行使介入權，降低其對公益之損害。然而，介入權為一集合權，其解釋與執行將依法源基礎而有所不同，故本文首先以法學之角度探討介入權於促參法之法源依據與執行背景；再者，促參法第52條所敘述之「施工進度嚴重落後…」在學理上被稱為不確定之法律概念，故欲建構－客觀之介入權對策機制，以作為政府行使介入權之參考依據。為建構該機制本文首先以會計之角度探討政府、聯貸銀行與特許公司三者之財務關係，並且以投資方案之評估程序與財務比率之設計分別建構介入權對策機制之評估準則與對策指標；最後，透過高雄捷運之案例分析，說明政府行使介入權所產生之效益，同時期望達到下列兩點貢獻1．避免特許公司之施工進度嚴重落後造成公益之損害2．降低政府與特許公司二者因介入權所產生之爭議。

關鍵字

促進民間參與公共建設法； BOT ；介入權；財務比率；高雄捷運

並列摘要

BOT projects require huge investments, are complex and diverse, require long construction and operations period, and are therefore high risk. To provide administrative agencies an objective reference when exercising the step-in right to safeguard public interest, this paper explores three issues: (1) the legal basis for the government to exercise its right to step in concession companies and grounds for such intervention; (2) the relationship between the progress in work schedule by the concession company and finances of the joint financing banks; and (3) an assessment guidelines and indicator for the strategy of step-in right.

並列關鍵字

BOT project ； Step-in Right ； Law for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects ； Analysis of Financing Index ； Kaohsiung MRT Project

參考文獻

曾宛如(2002)。公司外部監督之分析。台大法學論叢。31(1)

高雄市政府捷運工程局網站

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Cheng-Ping Lin,Tsung-Li Wang(2003).The Strategy of Step-in Right for Delay in BOT projects.The 11th Annual Conference on Pacific Basin Finance Economics and Accounting.(The 11th Annual Conference on Pacific Basin Finance Economics and Accounting).: