控制股東的股權偏離程度與公司績效：持股率與類別的調節效果

Controlling Shareholder's Separation of Share Rights and Firm Performance: The Role of Shareholding Ratio and Type

戴怡蕙(Yi-Hui Tai)

《會計審計論叢》 7卷2期 (2017/12) Pp. 85-115

摘要

過去研究指出控制股東的股份控制權通常大過於盈餘分配權，且當股份控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度越大時，代理問題會更嚴重。因此本研究第一項研究目的係探討控制股東的股份控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度對於公司績效的影響性。除此之外，文獻也提到控制股東的持股率會影響股權偏離程度的代理問題，因此本研究第二項研究目的係探討控制股東的持股率對於偏離程度對公司績效影響性的調節效果。再者，文獻也提出控制股東類別會影響股權偏離程度對於公司績效的影響效果。因此本研究第三項研究目的係探討控制股東的類別是否會改變偏離程度與持股率對於公司績效的影響性。本文以2009 年至2013 年的上市櫃公司為研究樣本，本文實證結果發現：控制股東的股權偏離程度對於公司績效存在負向影響。除此之外，控制股東的持股率及單一家族主導對於前述的負向影響具有調節效果。本文實證結果可以補充文獻的不足，並作為上市櫃公司建構公司治理機制參考之用。

關鍵字

控制股東 ； 公司績效 ； 股權偏離程度 ； 持股率 ； 單一家族主導

並列摘要

Prior literature asserted that the control rights of controlling shareholders are often larger than cash flow rights of them, and while the control-cash flow right deviation of controlling shareholders is larger, the agency problem will be seriously. Therefore, the first research purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between the control-cash flow right deviation of controlling shareholders and the firm's performance. In addition, previous studies also pointed out the ownership of controlling shareholders has the moderating effects on the above relationship. Then, the next purpose of this work is to examine whether the ownership of controlling shareholders has the moderating effects on the above relationship. Moreover, related literature suggested the type of controlling shareholders also influence the effect of control-cash flow right deviation on firm's performance; therefore, the third purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the type of controlling shareholders will change the effect of control-cash flow right deviation and ownership on firm's performance. Using firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei exchange from 2009 to 2013 as the sample, the empirical results show that the relationship between the control-cash flow right deviation of controlling shareholders and the firm's performance is negative. In addition, the ownership of controlling shareholders and the single family control both have the moderating effects on the above negative relationship. The results of this study complement the existing literature and serve as reference for companies trying to build corporate governance mechanism.

並列關鍵字

Controlling shareholder ； Firm performance ； Control-cash flow right deviation ； Ownership ； Single family control

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