本文旨在探討所有權結構與公司價值間之內生性關係。過去文獻指出企業因經營權與所有權分離,進而導致代理問題。本文則以董監事持股及經理人持股作為所有權定義,探討其對於公司價值是否有系統性及非線性的關係,並檢視道德風險問題是否因代理人持股提高而得到舒緩。再者,前人指出公司價值亦可能透過薪酬制度而影響代理人持股公司股份之意願。至此,公司價值與所有權結構間之內生性關係需要更進一步地的檢視而不應被忽略,以確保迴歸結果之一致性。針對所有權結構與公司價值間之內生性關係,本文試圖以 fixed effects 模型、 Hausman and Taylor 模型與聯立方程模型來驗證本文假說。除此之外,本研究亦透過各解釋變數與產業別之交乘項來探討電子業本質是否與其他產業存在差異。 綜合各模型所得較一致性之結論為,當董監事持股或管理者持股比例提高時,可能舒緩道德風險問題,進而提升公司價值;電子業之董監事持股比例對於公司價值亦有遞增但趨緩之顯著影響力。此外,電子業以權益為基礎之獎酬顯著誘使經理人與公司整體利益一致,並舒緩道德風險問題。最後,公司價值對於董監事持股具有顯著正向影響力;而公司價值僅在電子業中對經理人持股產生顯著正向影響力,反應現今電子業獎酬計畫及契約設計之初步狀況。
This study intends to probe into the endogenous relation between ownership structure and corporate value. Prior studies hold that while the power of control and ownership are separated, the agency problem is thus induced. In addition, some scholars maintain that firm value could reversely affect stockholdings of agents through reward plan. Therefore, the endogenous relation between ownership structure and firm value should be further discussed. The empirical results indicate that when the percentage of stockholdings of directors and supervisors is increased, the problem of moral hazard could be relieved and hence firm value is increased. In high-tech industries, there exists a nonlinear relation between the percentage of stockholdings of directors and supervisors, and firm value. Moreover, equity-based reward empirically provide a great function of incentive alignment in high-tech industries. Finally, firm value positively affects the stockholdings of directors and supervisors, while it is in high-tech industries that the influence on the stockholdings of managers is sustained.