行政與立法之間的互動關係：中央政府總預算審查的實證分析

Interaction Between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan: An Empirical Analysis of Central government Budget Review from 2005-2010

李克岐(Ke-Chi Lee)

指導教授 ： 羅清俊

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/公共行政暨政策學系/碩士(2014年)

摘要

本論文藉由過去與預算審查相關的研究文獻，並透過實證途徑，探討何種因素會影響到立法委員刪減行政機關預算的行為。由於預算審查的過程中，往往被視為是行政機關以及立法機關利益分配的角力，所以立法委員會「獎賞」或「懲罰」行政機關的預算，來換取將政策利益分配至自己的選區。在這種情況下，我們認為立法委員有很強的動機去刪減行政機關的預算。因此，筆者透過負二項迴歸模型與OLS迴歸模型，分別觀察立法委員的個人特質因素、國會制度性因素和選舉與選區因素，是否會影響到立法委員在預算審查過程中，積極刪減行政機關的預算，以及行政機關的特質因素和行政機關首長的特質因素，是否會影響行政機關預算被刪減的程度。

首先，在研究架構一（以立法委員為分析單位）中，本論文觀察到立法委員的個人特質因素，並不會影響到立法委員刪減行政機關預算時的行為。不過，在國會制度性因素方面，立法委員在預算審查時的表現，受到「是否屬於執政黨」以及「是否屬於委員會召集人」的影響則是相當明顯。另外，在選舉與選區因素方面，我們發現每當到了立法委員選舉年時、或是立法委員的所屬選區擁有比較多的利益團體時，皆會減少立法委員刪減行政機關預算的積極程度；其次，在研究架構二（以行政機關為分析單位）中，本論文觀察到肉桶利益性質越強的行政機關，比較能吸引立法委員去刪減該行政機關的預算。除此之外，我們也發現其
實是規模較大的行政機關與表現越差的行政機關（但「預算被刪凍次數」沒有達到統計上的顯著水準），其預算比較容易被立法委員刪減。在行政機關首長的特質因素方面，則是只有「過去是否擔任過其他行政機關首長（或是政務次長）」達到統計上的顯著水準（但「預算被刪凍金額」沒有達到統計上的顯著水準）。

總而言之，本論文發現立法委員在預算審查時的表現，確實會受到一些國會制度性因素和選舉與選區因素的影響，尤其是選舉與選區因素。再加上行政機關的特質若是屬於肉桶利益性質較強，其本身的預算也比較容易吸引到立法委員去刪減。所以說，立法委員刪減行政機關預算的動機，有很大的原因是為了將政策利益分配至自己的選區，以增加自己下一次選舉連任的機會。

關鍵字

預算審查 ； 立法委員 ； 行政機關 ； 行政與立法之間的互動關係

並列摘要

The present study aims to delve into different factors depends on empirical approach which affects the executive budget cut by legislators through reviewing several previous studies. It can be known as the political wrestle in benefit allotment between the executive and the legislative during the budget review process. Generally speaking, legislators will "reward" or "punish" the executive budget, to exchange for the allocation policy interests to their own constituency. This situation may lead to a phenomenon that legislators have a strong incentive to cut the executive budget. Based on the negative binominal regression model and OLS regression model, the special focus is put on three factors: "personal traits", "congressional institution", and "election and constituency". These factors are adopted to find out the influences on the budget review process and the cut of the budget. Besides, it is also expected to reveal the factors of "the traits of the executive" and "the traits of the executive head" which may affect whether the budget has been cut or not.

First, in the framework one (the legislator as the unit of analysis). The findings show that their personality traits does not play a prominent role in the cut of executive budget. However, the factors of "ruling party" and "leader of the committee members" show highly critical role during the budget review process. In addition, in the election and constituency factors, we found that many diverse factors can be shown to influence legislators’ decision making on cutting budgeted expenditure of executive budget such as, the year of election and the number of interest groups in their own constituency. This may lead the executive budget which cut by the legislator in different levels. In the framework two (the executive as the unit of analysis), we found that the executive have the stronger pork barrel incentive, and is able to attract legislators to cut the executive budget. In addition, we also found the executive with the larger scale and worse performance (that "number" is insignificantly in statistics), the budget has high possibility being cut by the legislator. In the traits of the executive head factors, the only possibility is that "experience of executive head (the other executive head)" plays the important role in the statistics (that "money" is insignificantly in statistics).

The finding show that the behavior of legislators during the process budget reviewing, are affected by "congressional institution factors" and "election and constituency factors", especially for the "election and constituency factors". Furthermore, if considered from the perspective of pork barrel incentive, legislators pay more attention to make the budget cut for executive. As a result, these findings imply that legislators allocate the political benefit in their own constituency for re-election.

並列關鍵字

Budget Review ； Legislator ； Executive ； Interaction Between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan

參考文獻

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