再論楊祖漢教授之論朱子之工夫為儒學的正宗

楊祖漢教授〈哲學思辨、自然的辯證及道德實踐的動力〉進一步論證程朱的工夫論雖然是在「心理為二」的架構之下，通過康德對「自然的辯證」之以哲學思辨的解決方式，可以轉用以支持朱子之工夫論中的思辨方法是可以達到正統儒家的「逆覺體證」工夫的目的。而且由此可見儒家的工夫論不能單以牟宗三先生所標舉的逆覺體證的方法為限。而且支持哲學思辨是一種從「常知」進到「真知」的工夫，足可以使人達到真正實踐道德法則的要求。而且，哲學思辨對逆覺體證的工夫也是有效的和必要的。本文主要釐清康德所強調的在化解「自然的辯證」中所用的理性的思辨只是深化定然律令的內容，實與工夫或道德動力之生發無關。而康德的自由意志與意念的結構，與義務中的敬畏之生起方式亦與朱子不同，故康德之說對朱子之工夫論沒有幫助。本文對思辨在儒家的工夫上的作用進行細部的分析，指出如楊教授大文所說的，在主張「心即理」的心學中，哲學思辨具有輔助的作用，但心學家的工夫由「逆覺體證」的道德本心或良知之發用，即足以成就真正的道德行動，毋須哲學思辨之助。而在朱子之「心理二分」下的「格物窮理」的思辨並不足以成為獨立有效的工夫教法。朱子之工夫是徹底的漸教，不能使實踐者成聖。此即證明朱子之工夫不是孔孟之傳統，也不能成就真正的道德實踐，確是別子為宗。本文最後申論，朱子的工夫中的思辨的功能，可以使實踐者成就一定的道德人格的表現，也有助了解何以朱子所主張的工夫論不對頭，仍然足以使朱子成為士林所承認的大賢。

關鍵字

工夫論；格物致知；自然的辯證；朱子；康德；牟宗三；楊祖漢

並列摘要

Professor Yang Cho Hon argues that the Song Confucian Cheng-Zhu's method of moral cultivation (kung fu) within the framework of a duality mind and reason, could be supported by Kant's idea of applying philosophical reflections in the solution of natural dialectics and makes it achieve the goal of orthodox Confucianism. Hence, the orthodox moral cultivation with the ＂reflective self-identification and embodiment of the moral mind＂ as it is described by the late Professor Mou Zongsan is not the only method of moral cultivation. And hence, it proves that philosophical analysis is a method of moral cultivation from ＂ordinary moral knowledge＂ towards ＂authentic moral knowledge＂ that could make practitioners come into grid with true moral practice and satisfying the requirement of moral law. It also shows that philosophical analysis is effective and a necessary component of the Confucian orthodox method of moral cultivation. In this paper, I try to show that what Kant does in his solution for the natural dialectics is to explore into details the content of categorical imperative and has nothing to do with moral cultivation or the drive for moral motivation. Kant's theory of the duality of free will and volition and his explanation of the way of the rise of the moral feeling of reverence is quite different from Zhu Xi's relation of Mind and Reason, and hence, Kant's idea serves no help to Zhu Xi's method of moral cultivation. In my detail analysis of the role played by philosophical reflection in moral cultivation, as what Yang points out, that in the Heart-Mind School, philosophical reflection may be of auxiliary assistance to their moral cultivation under the framework of Mind is Reason, but the moral cultivation method of this School needs no help from philosophical reflection as their method has the moral mind or liang-chi in charge with its own moral motivation directly manifested in moral practice. The practice of ＂chasing the ultimate reason of everything to the end＂ within Zhu Xi's framework of the separation of Mind and Reason, philosophical reflection could not by itself serve as an independent and effective method of moral cultivation. His method is a thorough piece-meal approach towards the achievement of the moral ideal and could never make one a sage. It shows that Zhu Xi's philosophy is different from the orthodox Confucius-Mencius line of tradition and is a lateral development. Lastly, I try to employ Yang's idea of the help of philosophical reflection in Zhu Xi's practice that explains while his moral cultivation fails what made him an adorable great Confucian with high moral status.