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地方官員升遷的影響因素研究-以中國各省為例

Determinants of Official Promotion-evidence from Chinese Provinces

摘要


本研究討論中國自改革開放以來,省長的升遷或職務異動的主要影響因素,特別是中國政治激勵機制、地方經濟表現以及地方投資之間的關係,本文資料期間涵蓋1979年至2011年,共256個省長有效樣本,以ordered probit model探討影響省長升遷的重要影響因素。實證結果顯示:經濟成長與省長升遷有直接正相關,而地方固定資產投資與升遷卻無直接相關,顯然在中國官員升遷機制中,地方經濟成長表現還是影響省長升遷非常重要的因素,但似乎並非透過提高投資達成。其他影響因素方面,年紀越大、任期越長越不易獲得升遷,此應與中國官員年輕化、專業化的政策有關。另外,外人直接投資對於省長升遷也有極為顯著的正向影響,也是有助省長升遷的重要因素之一。而其他如:失業率、科教文衛支出、城鄉差距等因素對省長的升遷卻無顯著的影響。

並列摘要


The paper aims to study the determinants of official promotion, especially focusing on the relationships among China's official promotion mechanism, economic growth and local investment past the China's economic reform in 1979. Using 256 provincial governors during the period from 1979 to 2011, this study explores the determinants of governors' promotion based on an ordered probit model. The empirical results reveal that provincial governors' promotion is positively connected with their economic growth performance, but not significantly affected by the average investment during the tenure of the governors. This result coincides with previous literature in that economic growth is indeed the most important factor of Chinese official selection and promotion system. However, fixed asset investment does not have the same effect. In the aspect of governors' personal characteristic factors, younger age and shorter term are two helpful factors. Furthermore, foreign direct investment exhibits very significantly positive effects on governors' promotion. The importance of foreign direct investment obviously exceeds that of fixed asset investment in terms of the role in Chinese official promotion. Other factors like unemployment rate and discrepancy between urban and rural districts do not shed significant effects on governor's promotion.

參考文獻


王賢彬、徐現祥、李郇(2009)。地方官員更替與經濟成長。經濟學季刊。8(4),1301-1328。
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