政治控制、市場競爭與地方黨報的影響力：廣東、上海、天津的比較研究

Political Control, Market Competition and the Influence of Local Party Organs: Comparative Case Studies on Guangdong, Shanghai and Tianjin

劉偉偉(Weiwei LIU)

《傳播與社會學刊》 24期 (2013/04) Pp. 155-192

https://doi.org/10.30180/CS.201304_(24).0007

摘要

開風氣、「敢為天下先」的黨報，為甚麼總在廣東，而不是其他地方？同樣是黨報，為甚麼各地黨報的影響力差別這麼大？不同的「政治控制－市場競爭」的結構組合，是導致各地黨報影響力差異的主要原因。在大部分地區，或者政治控制比廣東強，或者市場競爭比廣東弱。從地域上看，廣東黨報改革的步伐比其他地方大些，影響力更大。從行政層級上看，地市級黨報比省級黨報的自由度大些，市場化的程度更高些。黨報的性質決定了它永遠不可能真正市場化，改革是有限度的。

關鍵字

政治控制 ； 市場競爭 ； 黨報 ； 影響力

並列摘要

Why are the party organs of Guangdong always bellwethers among Chinese local party organs in terms of media reform? Why are the party organs of Guangdong more influential than other local party organs? Different structures of ＂political control - market competition＂ result in the party organs having different degrees of influence. Compared to other party organs, those of Guangdong face a unique circumstance: more freedom in politics and more competitors in the market. The party organs of Guangdong always blaze a way into newspaper reform. Civic party organs have more free choice in terms of politics and economics than provincial party organs do. The reform of party organs is decidedly restricted and will never totally participate in market competition.

並列關鍵字

political control ； market competition ； party organs ； influence