現階段立法院黨團協商之研究（2008.2.1至2009.6.16）

The Present Status of the Party Caucus Negotiation in Legislative Yuan (Feb. 1st, 2008 - Jun. 16th, 2009)

周建邦(Chien-Pang Chou)

指導教授 ： 黃錦堂

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.00254

摘要

過去的理論與實證研究皆指出，黨團協商與促進議事效率關係密切，然而協商要有意義、實質進行的前提條件是，要存在理性討論的空間。2008年2月1日第七屆立法院正式運作後，出現朝野席次分配差距過大的現象，與以往國會結構迥異，這是否意味著當前的政治環境是否已經演變到了藍、綠根本不可能好好討論的程度，導致根本不可能出現理性溝通的協商？
透過立法成果的變化、國會黨團運用協商的方式及黨團協商的修法方向這三方面進行分析，本文發現黨團協商與議事效率的正相關越來越淡薄，甚至轉變為負相關，一但黨團協商對議事效率造成危害，就否定了過去研究給予黨團協商的存在價值。之所以會發生這個問題，是因為當前台灣社會缺乏和諧互信，國會政治生態難以合作，導致立法院各黨團缺乏溝通意願，立法院的理性討論空間面臨空前的危機，使得黨團協商不易成功，無法化解立法爭議。
比較觀察英、美、德這些先進國家的國會，發現各自有將溝通納入議事運作的制度，且運作良好，這與該等國家的民主深化程度有關，早已體認溝通對處理衝突的重要性，並具體落實在國會的運作上。然而台灣尚在摸索適合國情的民主形狀，就「民主該怎麼解決衝突」的問題，仍停留在「多數決原則」處理的認識而已。本文以為，該問題應以「溝通優先，多數決優位」的方向思考，才能調和民主理想與台灣現實的落差。
理想的民主應該靠溝通處理衝突，從而遇到衝突時應優先溝通處理，但在溝通失敗後，為維持社會前進，需要貫徹多數決原則的優位地位。之所以強調優先溝通，是因為少數能透過溝通發聲，同時為了讓少數表達意見，社會已耗費相當成本，民主講求的「尊重少數」因為「溝通」賦予少數發聲權利獲得滿足，少數不應再以此為由抗議、不服從甚至阻撓多數決的進行。
「溝通優先，多數決優位」也應是立法院處理立法爭議的方式，現行的黨團協商制度得負擔在國會內溝通的任務，同時由於協商過程需對外公開，少數黨能經由黨團協商向社會表達政黨立場，獲得足夠發聲權利，立法院也因舉行協商投入相當的國會資源，因此議案經過協商代表已經尊重國會少數，從而當協商不成院會處理時，為維護多數決原則在立法院的優位地位，得限制冗長發言、簡化討論、表決過程、排除議事干擾，這些效果將同時改變目前黨團不願協商的現象。
最後本文檢討98年度中央政府總預算案、集會遊行法、再生能源發展條例、農村再生條例的立法過程，分析各案中黨團協商溝通成功或失敗的原因，及能否順利行使多數決原則，對黨團協商提出改進方向及修法建議。除解決案例實際發生的問題外，並藉此增加未來黨團協商溝通成功的可能性，幫助多數決原則在立法院貫徹執行，並進一步具體說明如何讓國會多數和少數重回協商，並讓協商過程儘量朝理性溝通的方向發展，以挽救立法院的理性討論空間不足的問題。
此外，需特別指出，本文係從溝通行為的角度出發，對黨團協商進行研究探討，然除溝通的面向外，黨團協商於現實運作時，也可能是政黨的策略性行為，與本文所稱的理性溝通有極大差距，從而若從政治策略運用的角度切入研究，將會對黨團協商有不同的認識，亦能獲得相當豐碩的研究成果。

關鍵字

黨團協商 ； 議事效率 ； 立法院 ； 立法爭議 ； 溝通行為理論 ； 多數決原則 ； 尊重少數

並列摘要

Previous studies have found a robust link between legislative efficiency and the party caucus negotiation; however, successful negotiation is based upon communicative rationality. Since the Nationalist Party (KMT) has held an absolute majority of seats in the 7th Legislative Yuan (since Feb. 1st, 2008), the conflicts between ruling and opposition parties might become more intense, resulting in irrational communication.
After examining the outcomes, methods and directions of cross-party negotiation, the current study found that the effects of negotiation on legislative efficiency may have weakened or even become negative in Legislative Yuan. The negative effects of negotiation may lead people to question the value of negotiation as documented in previous studies. One possible explanation is that the lack of trust may make cross-party cooperation difficult, endanger rational communication, and subsequently curb the process of reaching consensus.
Legislative bodies in modern societies like the U.K., U.S., and Germany have long histories in the practice of negotiation. These countries have not only accepted the importance of negotiation in resolving political conflicts but have also successfully implemented negotiation in the process of legislation. Taiwan, however, has just started learning democratic practices and might only know the majority rule. The current study suggests that “negotiation first, majority rules” may bridge the gap between democratic ideals and the current political situation in Taiwan.
An ideal democratic society may heavily rely on negotiation to resolve conflicts, suggesting that negotiation should come first when facing conflicts but that majority should rule when dealing with negotiation deadlock in order to make progress. On the one hand, the minorities can voice themselves through negotiation, which is in accordance with the value of respecting the minority in democratic systems. On the other, minorities should not boycott meetings but follow the decisions made by the majority after negotiation has provided the channel for mutual communication.
Therefore,“negotiation first, majority rules” may be one possible solution to reach consensus during legislative process. The mechanism of cross-party negotiation is made for mutual communication among parties. In addition, the transparent negotiation process may give the minority party a right to express its appeals in public, which may decrease the chance of boycott during legislative meetings. Negotiation may not only manifest minority rights in democratic representation but also legitimate majority rule in legislative practice, through which legislative efficiency can be maintained.
In order to discover the factors which predict the outcomes of negotiation, I analyzed legislative processes of the general budget proposal for central government (2009), Assembly and Parade Act, Renewable Energy Development Act, and Rural Renewal Regulations. Several suggestions about resolving political conflicts, enhancing rational communication, and facilitating successful negotiation were made through a series of examinations of negotiation process in each case.
This study applied the frameworks of communication behaviors to examine cross-party negotiations; however, negotiation may be adopted by parties as a strategic behavior for political appeals, which is different from rational communication as discussed in this study. Future research may approach the issues of negotiation via the applications of political strategies for broadening our understanding.

並列關鍵字

the party caucus negotiation ； legislative efficiency ； Legislative Yuan ； legislative dispute ； the theory of communicative action ； majority rule ； minority rights

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