國內引進私募制度,提供企業一項迅速籌資的管道,有別於公開招募資金,私募排除現有股東優先認購之權利,當私募股權折價幅度愈高,稀釋現有股東權益的情況愈嚴重,但特定人士卻因而得利,由於私募賦予企業操縱價格的空間,公司治理機制是否能發揮董事會與股東會的監督功能、盈餘管理行為與無形資產是否影響特定人支付價格之意願,將會影響折價幅度之決定,故本文建立迴歸模型來探討公司治理機制、盈餘管理行為與無形資產對私募股權折價幅度之影響。 實證結果顯示,在公司治理機制方面,董監持股比率愈高,董監事與股東利益愈一致,私募股權折價幅度愈小,然而董監質押比率愈高,私募股權折價幅度愈大,董監事組成中,當獨立董監席次比率愈高,董事會愈能發揮獨立監督功能,私募股權折價幅度愈小,至於經理人董監席次比率愈高,愈能減少董事會資訊不對稱的情況,私募股權折價幅度愈小,以上均支持本文研究假說;至於控制股東董監席次比率愈高,私募股權折價幅度愈小,不支持本文研究假說。在盈餘管理行為方面,當公司以處分投資損益為盈餘管理時,盈餘管理程度愈大,私募股權折價幅度愈大;在無形資產方面,公司投入無形資產之成本對私募股權折價幅度沒有顯著影響,但以淨值市價比衡量未入帳之無形資產,當淨值市價比愈大,未入帳之無形資產愈少,私募股權折價幅度愈小。
The mechanism of private equity placement in Taiwan provides firms with more convenient way to raise their funds. However, in contrast to public issues, it excludes the priority of existing shareholders from buying new shares and dilutes their interests through discount of issue price for specific purpose. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the discount of private equity placement is afftected by the mechanism of corporate governance, firms’ earnings management behavior and the magnitude of intangible assets. The empirical findings of this study document that the discount of private equity placement is greater when the percentage of the directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings that are pledged is larger. The discount is negatively related to the directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings, the ratio of independent directors and supervisors over board size, and the ratio of directors and supervisors who are also mangers over board size. In addition, the firms’ earnings management behavior proxied by sale on investment is positively related to the discount of private equity placement. Finally, the the magnitude of intangible assets measured by book-to-market ratio is negatively related to the discount of private equity placement. In gereral, the results support hypotheses proposed by this study.