臺北都市更新的制度成本

臺北都市更新工作的推動從《都市更新條例》頒行前, 已經有市場力量存在：一些具備土地法令知識專業的建商, 從事產權複雜的土地開發整合, 與地主或老舊社區住戶簽訂合建契約書, 進行都市土地的重建。《都市更新條例》頒行之後, 陰錯陽差地先在921地震重建地區試行。許多執行法令的解釋與審議規範的補充, 多數都是為這些自力更新的社區量身打造。這導致都市更新供需雙方能自發成交的市場機能是否能夠運作, 並未特別受到關注。又因為不動產自1993年以來超過10年連續上漲的好景氣, 誤以為制度設計是有利於市場運作的。而當房地產上漲的景氣在2015年停滯時, 為數眾多的都市更新案件跟著也都停擺, 才使得都市更新制度不利於市場運作的真相浮現。以往都市更新爭議聚焦於「居住正義」或「黑心建商」等語意不清的口號, 在建商紛紛退場後, 社區裡的住戶間為求重建房屋而不可得, 互相指責逐漸了解到, 土地與建物的基本的產權糾紛、多數人決策的統整過程, 以及權利變換估價所涉及數量龐大的相對價格, 以往都由建商代替地主排除, 原來建商付出了如此高昂的制度成本, 承擔了主要推動制度的角色。本文嘗試從經濟學的產權以及交易成本理論來解析都市更新市場現象背後的成因, 透過產權理論、交易成本、 Coase定理、佃農理論及Coase猜想等經濟學分析工具, 來探討都市更新權利變換制度中, 制度成本隱藏在那些問題當中。並且指制度安排上應使真正承擔推動責任的建商, 獲得適當的獲利誘因, 才能透過市場引進民間經濟活力, 達到都市更新法制的目標。

關鍵字

都市更新；產權理論；交易成本； Coase定理； Coase猜想；佃農理論

並列摘要

After the issuance of the Urban Renewal Act, which was first accidentally applied to the 921 earthquake-stricken areas, the market mechanism has neglected from the discussion of the Act, and this resulted in the legal design not being able to function properly in the market. However, the boom in the real estate industry over 10 years lasting since 2004 was misunderstood as the market efficiency of the Act. During that period, developers paid a considerable amount of institutional costs by their extra profit, which sould have be paid by landowners, to make urban renewal possible. After that, developers have not able to do that, and the urban renewal in Taipei has basically suspended. This essay examines the urban renewal market phenomenon in Taipei to find out if the legal design still help developers to earn excess profits after all the sugar-coated factors dissipated. Then apply property rights theory, Coase theorem, the theory of share tenancy and Coase conjecture to explore the institutional costs which fail the market.