白山、黑水與赤焰：再論東北決戰時國、共的戰略成敗

1948年9月12日，中共軍隊在中國東北展開秋季攻勢，目標之一為佔領北寧鐵路線，藉此封鎖關內與關外國府軍隊的聯繫。這次攻勢後來演變成與國軍的決戰，結果國軍兵敗而完全失去對東北的控制。本文擬研究這場決定性的戰事。因為相較於1948年之前的戰事，該年的戰場情勢有了顯著的變化，共軍必須轉向大兵團和攻堅戰才能因應，但至今多數論者未強調這個轉變與作戰計畫的擬定其實是相互影響。若未從這個角度去分析，似乎就解釋不清楚共軍如何布局，也無法更適切地解釋國、共雙方的勝敗。此外，國軍固守長春、瀋陽和錦州的戰略其實困擾著共軍，那麼國軍的戰略究竟如何遭共軍突破有必要進一步分析。經本文研究，過往將共軍勝利的主因歸於林彪服從了毛澤東對戰局的遠見，是不適當的歷史解讀。透過進一步考察，林彪與毛澤東其實是透過密切意見交流後，才在1948年9月確立了南下作戰與攻堅錦州的戰略。本文認為共軍之所以能夠實踐這個戰略，也就是共軍勝利的主因，是因為在商討與決策過程中，充分地考量了熱河一帶糧食的秋收時間，及南下鐵路興建完成的時間，還有利用長期圍困長春國軍所形成的有利情勢，即造成國軍嚴重飢困，使共軍節省圍困國軍的兵力，進而能調派更多部隊南下作戰和攻堅錦州。當共軍實踐上述戰略時，國軍的固守戰略已遭突破但卻無應對良策。

關鍵字

遼瀋戰役（遼西會戰、錦瀋會戰）；國共內戰（解放戰爭）；解放軍；東北野戰軍；蔣中正（蔣介石）；衛立煌；後勤

並列摘要

This thesis examines a crucial battle launched by the Chinese Communist army, which began as an attack on September 12, 1948 to disrupt the collaboration between the Nationalist army stationed in Manchuria and the one stationed in North China. One of the objectives of the Communist army was to occupy a few nearby strongholds along the Bei-Ning line, including Jinzhou city. This attack evolved into a decisive battle for both sides, ending with the Nationalist army losing the entire Manchuria. Since the circumstances on the battlefield had significantly changed in 1948, the Communist army had to prepare for a much larger attack and for assault on the strongholds or the major cities. However, very few scholars have emphasized how the circumstances on the battlefield and the Communist army’s strategic plans in fact influenced each other. If we do not examine the battle from this angle, we could not properly explain why the Communist army was able to attack the Bei-Ning line and how the Communist army defeated the Nationalist army. Moreover, the strategy employed by the Nationalist army to defend their strongholds had worked until it was sabotaged by the Communist army. We need to analyze how the Communist army accomplished this feat. As I will discuss, it is not correct to attribute the main cause of the communist victory to Lin Biao’s execution of Mao Zedong’s foresight. I argue that the Communist army was able to launch the attack on the Bei-Ning line and Jinzhou city and consequently won the battle because Mao Zedong had cooperated with Lin Biao closely in making this strategy since early 1948. Moreover, the Communist army was able to carry out this strategy because they considered seriously the timing of the harvest in the Rehe area and the building of the railway to the Jinzhou area. Last but not least, they took full advantage of the siege of Changchun city, weakening the Nationalist army through strict economic blockade. Such a strategy in turn enabled the Communist army to deploy more forces to the Bei-Ning line. At the same time, the Nationalist army’s strategy of defending their strongholds was sabotaged and yet they had no better alternative.

並列關鍵字

Liaoshen Campaign (Liaohsi Campaign) ； Chinese Civil War (War of Liberation) ； People's Liberation Army ； the Northeast Field Army ； Chiang Kai-shek ； Wei Li-huang ； Logistics