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  • 學位論文

外部審計特質與主管薪酬制度對盈餘管理之影響:以保險業取得成本攤銷為例

The Impacts of Auditor Characteristics and Compensation Components on Earnings Management: Evidence from Amortizations of Insurance Acquisition Costs

指導教授 : 劉啟群

摘要


不同於過去文獻使用裁決性應計項目等作為衡量盈餘管理之工具,本研究係以劉啟群與廖懿屏(2012)之研究為基礎,以保險業保單取得成本攤銷作為衡量管理者盈餘管理之工具,運用迴歸分析,分別檢視在不同外部審計特質以及高階主管薪酬制度之下,保險業經理人進行盈餘管理,以達成財務報表動機(如:盈餘平穩化、避免損失、達成分析師預期及洗大澡)之行為。   本研究實證結果,與過去文獻一致,顯示外部審計特質(會計師事務所任期與審計產業專家)與管理者從事盈餘管理行為具有一定的關聯性;此外,不同主管薪酬制度(限制型股票當期給與部分、選擇權當期給與、行使與可行使部分、長期股權獎酬計畫、會計屬性關連獎酬計畫),與管理者透過保單取得成本攤銷進行盈餘管理,以達成財務報表動機之行為具有關聯性。

並列摘要


Unlike studies that use estimated abnormal accruals or loss reverse errors, in this study, I further extend Liu and Liao (2012) by using Deferred Acquisition Costs (DAC) amortization expense as a proxy for managerial discretion to investigate how various external auditor characteristics and executive compensation components related to executives discretionary reporting incentives (e.g. smoothing earnings, avoiding reported losses, meeting analysts’ forecast and taking a big bath) in insurance industry. Consistent with the prior literature utilizing estimated abnormal accruals(Cornett et al., 2008; 2009) and loss reserve errors (Browne et al., 2009; Eckles et al., 2011), my results suggest that external auditor characteristics (e. g. auditor tenures and auditor specialist) are associated with earnings manipulative behaviors; and incentive-based compensation (e. g. restricted stock grants, stock option awards, exercised, and exercisable, long-term performance plans and accounting-based bonus and performance plans) encourages managers to use discretion over accounting practices to maximize their own utility.

參考文獻


Aboody, D., and R. Kasznik, 2000, CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29(1): 73-100.
Arora, A., and P. Alam, 1999, The Effect of Adopting Accounting-Based Bonus and Performance Incentive Plans on the Earnings Response Coefficient, Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 14(1): 1-28.
Burns, N., and S. Kedia, 2006, The Impact of Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting, Journal of Financial Economics, 79: 35-67.
Chen, J. P., S. Chen, X. Su, and Y. Wang, 2004, Incentives for and Consequences of Initial Voluntary Asset Write-downs in the Emerging Chinese Market. Journal of International Accounting Research, 3: 43-61.
Cheng, Q. and T. Warfield, 2005, Equity Incentives and Earnings Management, The Accounting Review, 80: 441-476.

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