董監變動薪酬與固定薪酬揭露方式對盈餘管理之影響

本研究探討不同揭露方式上不同性質的董監薪酬對盈餘管理的影響，本文將揭露方式分為2006年到2007年及2008年到2018年進行比較，其中，揭露方式分為三種:級距彙總揭露、自願性個別揭露與強制性個別揭露，而強制性個別揭露是自2008年修法上路，因此區分為兩個時間段進行比較，實證結果發現在新增強制法規前，當公司採用自願性個別揭露時，董監變動薪酬越高越不會進行實質盈餘管理，表示薪酬揭露的資訊透明度愈高，愈能抑制實質盈餘管理發生，而在裁決性應計數中只發現不同性質的董監薪酬對盈餘管理有不同誘因，董監變動薪酬越高，越不容易進行裁決性應計數，但固定薪酬未呈顯著，表示固定薪酬較無誘因進行裁決性應計數。而在新增強制性法規後，變動薪酬與固定薪酬對盈餘管理之關聯，仍與前段時期相同，而揭露方式上，相同的薪酬揭露資訊透明度對盈餘管理沒有顯著影響。在額外分析中，再次比較級距彙總揭露及自願性個別揭露在新增強制性法規後是否產生改變，結果發現自願性個別揭露的公司揭露的變動薪酬越高轉為更不傾向對標準化異常裁決性費用進行實質盈餘管理，而固定薪酬與新增前結果相同。在裁決性應計數中，自願性個別揭露的公司揭露的固定薪酬由無影響，轉為較高固定薪酬的公司更傾向進行向上的裁決性應計數，而不是實質盈餘管理。

關鍵字

薪酬揭露方式；董監事薪酬；盈餘管理

並列摘要

This paper exams the impact of director compensation cost behavior disclosure to earning management. Three disclosures types (voluntary disclosure by class interval, voluntary disclosure by individual and mandatory disclosure by individual) are discussed during 2006 to 2007, and 2008 to 2018. The findings are, before the enforcement of disclosure regulation in 2008, when companies adopt voluntary disclosure by individual, the higher the variable director compensation, the lower the possibility for companies to perform real earnings management. It implies more information disclosure transparency the more effective it can inhibit the real earnings management. In the discretionary accruals, during 2006 to 2007, the findings are, the higher the variable compensation, the lower the possibility for companies to manipulate discretionary accruals. However, after the enforcement of disclosure regulation in 2008, although the information transparency is enhanced, the result remains the same. The finding indicates the enforcement of disclosure regulation is limited in corporation governance. An additional test finds that in class interval disclosure, if we discard mandatory individual disclosures and compare voluntary individual disclosures and voluntary disclosure by class interval, we found that companies with voluntary individual disclosure tend to the higher the variable compensation, the lower the possibility for companies to standardization abnormal cash flows. In the discretionary accruals, when companies adopt the voluntary individual disclosure ,the higher fixed compensation, the higher the possibility for companies to manipulate upward of discretionary accruals, rather than real earnings management.