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  • 學位論文

董監酬勞與會計資訊品質--從盈餘管理與資訊揭露的角度探討

Compensation of Board of Director and Accounting Quality--Evidence from Earnings Management and Information Disclosure

指導教授 : 廖益興
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摘要


過去董監酬勞之研究,泰半是探討其與績效的關聯性,較少文獻探討其與盈餘管理或與資訊揭露透明度的關係。而本研究模型一首先探討董監酬勞與盈餘管理之關聯性,實證結果發現,當董監事薪酬水準愈高時,董監事從事盈餘管理的行為會愈大;研究更進一步測試,家族控制企業領取董監酬勞之高低是否會影響裁決性應計數,亦發現相較於非家族控制企業,家族控制企業會領取較少的薪酬,但從事盈餘管理之行為仍較非家族企業大。 研究模型二則測試董監酬勞與證基會資訊揭露透明度評鑑結果之關聯性,實證結果發現資訊揭露透明度與董監酬勞關聯性並不顯著。但家族控制企業資訊揭露透明度確實較非家族企業為低,尤其當家族控制企業領取較多董監酬勞時其資訊揭露透明度更低。

並列摘要


In the past, director compensation in studies is mostly emphasized on its relationship with company’s performance, but less on earnings management or information transparency. In this research, we begin with model one to investigate the connection between director compensation and earnings management. As the result shows, the more the director compensation are, the deeper the directors of board would be involved in earnings management. Further tests are conducted to see the influence on discretionary accruals when the director compensation in family controlled firms is on different levels. It also shows that the family controlled firms, contrast to those non-family controlled, may acquire less payment, but still they involves deeper in earnings management than those non-family controlled do. Model two is conducted to study the relationship between information transparency, from the Securities and Futures Institute, and director compensation. The result indicates that there is no significant connection between both. However, the information transparency indeed becomes lower when the information comes from family controlled firms rather than non-family controlled ones. Especially, when more director compensation is acquired in a family controlled firm, the information transparency will much drop down.

參考文獻


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