董監事薪酬揭露方式對盈餘管理程度之影響

The Effect of the Disclosure Types of Directors and Supervisors' Compensation on Level of Earnings Management

黃永杰(Yung-Chieh Huang)

指導教授 ： 林谷峻

淡江大學/商管學院/會計學系碩士班/碩士(2020年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2020.00638

摘要

在金融海嘯後，公司因經濟衰退瀕臨破產危機，但其中虧損公司的高階管理者卻仍坐領高薪之情況屢屢發生，導致各國政府對董監薪酬揭露法規制定更加嚴謹，然而我國現行法規仍無法如國外全面性個別揭露薪酬，使董監事及管理階層為能領取高額薪酬，存在操縱盈餘管理誘因，因此本研究利用金管會所制定法規，將董監薪酬揭露方式分為自願性個別揭露、強制性個別揭露及彙總配合級距揭露，探討不同揭露透明度是否會影響管理階層操縱盈餘管理，並進一步分析自願性個別揭露與強制性個別揭露對盈餘管理程度之影響，及被列為強制性個別揭露原因。由實證結果發現，薪酬揭露資訊透明度愈高，愈能抑制盈餘管理發生，此外，強制性揭露相較於自願性揭露，其盈餘管理程度較高，最後，在強制性揭露下對盈餘管理之影響，公司績效表現比董事會股權結構影響來得大。冀望研究結果能提供給制訂相關法規當局作參考，以規劃完善的薪酬法規制度保障投資人權利。

關鍵字

資訊透明度 ； 實質盈餘管理 ； 董監薪酬揭露

並列摘要

After the financial tsunami, the company was on the brink of bankruptcy due to economic recession, but the excessive compensation of top managers have happened in loss companies. This has led governments around the world to formulate stricter rules on the disclosure of directors and supervisors’ compensation. However, current laws and regulations in Taiwan are still unable to disclosure the comprehensive of individual compensation such as foreign countries. In order to receive high compensation, directors and supervisors have incentives to manipulate earnings management with the management. Therefore, this study uses the regulations that formulated by the Financial Supervisory Commission to divide the disclosure types of directors and supervisors' compensation into the voluntary disclosure of individual compensation, the mandatory disclosure of individual compensation, and the disclosure of aggregate compensation. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether different disclosure transparency will affect management's motivation to manipulate earnings management. This thesis further explores the impact of voluntary disclosure of individual compensation and mandatory disclosure of individual compensation on earnings management and the reasons for listed as mandatory disclosure of individual compensation. The empirical results show that the higher the transparency of salary disclosure information, the more the earnings management is restrained. In addition, the mandatory disclosure has higher level of earnings management than the voluntary disclosure. Finally, the firm performance has greater impact than the board structure on earnings management under the mandatory disclosure. The result is projected to provide reference to the relevant regulatory authorities for implementation of laws.

並列關鍵字

Information transparency ； Real earnings management ； Disclosure of directors and supervisors' compensation

參考文獻

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.

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