中國「一帶一路」戰略中高鐵外交策略分析

2013年中國國家主席習近平於中亞四國進行國事訪問訪問及出席亞太經濟合作組織高峰會非正式會議期間，提出了「絲綢之路經濟帶」和「21世紀海上絲綢之路」的戰略構想。，可以視為中國針對美國2009年以來實施的「亞太再平衡」及「重返亞太」的因應策略。在面對美國、日本、臺灣、菲律賓以及越南等國的海上封鎖，作為崛起中的強國，中國亟欲掙脫此戰略圍繞，而藉由陸權擴張以及區域一體化的策略，構築跨境的高速鐵路建設，連結周邊國家，似乎成為中國擺脫西方強權的一盞明燈。故自2013年10月起，中國國務院總理李克強扮演起「中國高鐵推銷員」的角色，先後在泰國、上合組織、澳洲、中東歐、非洲、美國以及英國推銷過中國高鐵技術，期望藉由輸出中國式高鐵技術以及跨境鐵路建設突破圍堵，「高鐵外交」儼然成為習近平「一帶一路」倡議的戰略武器。然而高速鐵路的建設通常伴隨龐大的貸款及融資問題，而中國周邊發展中國家大多無力支持，最後伴隨中國強勢的經濟及政治實力，上述國家只能藉由自然資源（能源）輸出、營運權轉讓、土地租借等方式償還龐大債務，且部分高鐵建設牽涉跨境議題，由於牽涉國境界線，導致「中國威脅論」等議題逐步發酵，故中國在周邊國家的「高鐵外交」談判上，由初期的熱絡風光，逐步在各國民意的懷疑、擔憂下，漸趨黯淡，遭遇許多壓力及反彈。本文嘗試分析「高鐵外交」在「一帶一路」倡議下所扮演的角色為何，並整理中國在泛亞、中亞以及歐亞鐵路的建設及協商進程，當地輿情反應及面對的挑戰，進而分析中國目前藉由「高鐵外交」策略是否能夠達成原先規劃的目標，協助「一帶一路」倡議的推進。

關鍵字

一帶一路；高鐵外交；亞太再平衡；重返亞太

並列摘要

During his state visit to the four countries of Central Asia and at the informal meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed a strategic concept of the“Silk Road Economic Belt” and the“21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, which can be regarded as China’s strategic response to the "Asia rebalance" and "Pivot to Asia" of the United States since 2009. Facing the maritime blockade of countries like the United States, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, a rising power as China was eager to break free. Through the land power expansion and regional integration strategies where cross-border high-speed railways linking neighboring countries were constructed, China saw a beacon of hope to break free from Western Powers. Since October 2013, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has played the role of “Chinese high-speed railway salesman” and has promoted Chinese high-speed railway technology in Thailand, SCO, Australia, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, the United States, and the United Kingdom. By exporting Chinese-style high-speed rail technology and cross-border railway construction, “High-speed railway diplomacy” has become a strategic weapon for Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” initiative. However, the construction of high-speed railways is usually accompanied by huge loans and financing complexities which most developing countries surrounding China are unable to support. Consequently under the influence of China’s strong economic and political power, these countries resorted to exporting natural resources (energy), transferring operating rights, leasing lands, and other means to repay the high debts. In addition, some high-speed railway construction involves cross-border issues, thus the “China threat theory” has emerged, casting a shadow on the “high-speed railway diplomacy” negotiations with China’s neighboring countries. Enthusiasm has gradually faded under the pressure and opposition stemmed from the suspicions and worries of the public opinion in various countries. This paper attempts to analyze the role played by the "High-speed railway diplomacy" under the "Belt and Road ”, to sort out China's progress in the construction and consultation of the railways in Trans-Asia, Central Asia, and Eurasia, and to clarify the local public opinions and challenges, in order to analyze whether China’s “High-speed railway diplomacy” is able to achieve its original goals, and assist the implementation of the “One Belt One Road” Strategy.