從WTO貿易救濟案件探討司法經濟原則於爭端解決程序之適用與界限

在WTO爭端解決體系重視爭端的迅速解決以及案件數量與複雜度日益提高的催化下，爭端解決小組延續GATT時代小組在案件中適用司法經濟原則的慣例，不審理對解決爭端無必要的請求，著重對解決爭端有實質助益的請求做出認定。在「美國—羊毛衫」案，上訴機構亦肯定了小組擁有適用司法經濟的裁量權，自此之後的許多案件中也可以看到小組適用司法經濟原則，來減少審理花費的時間與精力，達到節約司法資源的目的。儘管小組擁有適用司法經濟的裁量權已經成為共識，但爭端案例以及研究中也不乏對於小組錯誤或不當適用司法經濟原則的批評，以及對適用司法原則所衍生問題的擔憂。其中最為人詬病的問題就是上訴機構面臨無法完成分析的困境，以及在爭端解決實踐上，司法經濟原則裁量權的適用缺乏共通一致的標準或時機。本文旨在探討適用司法經濟裁量權的界限，以減少小組因為錯誤適用司法經濟原則造成的問題。鑒於貿易救濟案件在涉及司法經濟原則占據多數，本文從貿易救濟相關案件出發，整理並歸納小組適用司法經濟原則的時機，並指明實踐上引發的問題。最後則以文獻對解決司法經濟原則適用問題的方法出發，探尋應該如何規範司法經濟原則的適用以減少錯誤或不當適用司法經濟原則的發生。

關鍵字

司法經濟；爭端解決；貿易救濟；反傾銷；補貼；防衛

並列摘要

Stimulated by the aim of the WTO Dispute Settlement System for prompt settlement of disputes, and the increase in the number and complexity of cases, WTO panels have retained the GATT-era practice of exercising judicial economy when reviewing cases, i.e., making findings on claims that are necessary for resolving the disputes only and not reviewing those which are not. The Appellate Body in US Wool Shirts and Blouses also supported this discretion of panels to exercise judicial economy. From then on, the invocation of judicial economy by panels has been seen in many cases to reduce the time and efforts spent on resolving disputes and saving judicial resources. While this discretion has been widely recognized, there are still criticisms of false judicial economy and worrisome about the problems resulting from exercising judicial economy from parties to disputes and literature of scholars. Some of the most criticized ones are the inability of the Appellate Body to complete the analysis due to the lack of factual findings in panel reports, and the absence of a consistent practice of when to exercise judicial economy. This article aims at exploring the boundaries of exercising judicial economy to decrease the false use of this discretion and the problems resulting from it. Given the presence of trade remedy disputes in terms of a high number of cases in judicial economy-related disputes, this article starts by examining the practice of panels exercising judicial economy in trade remedy disputes. Then, the timings when panels would invoke this discretion are categorized and problems arising from this practice are discovered. Finally, based on past works of literature about solving the problems of exercising judicial economy, this article offers arguments on how to regulate the use of judicial economy to limit the presence of false judicial economy.