考慮品牌策略及通路結構之定價策略

網路銷售通路的引進及自有品牌的發展已成為製造商與零售商開發市場及增加競爭力的銷售策略。許多文獻已分別討論網路通路與自有品牌對供應鏈的影響，但尚未對該策略的互動進行討論與分析。本論文探討的供應通路模型主要由一個製造商的網路通路以及零售商的傳統通路所形成。製造商銷售產品至零售商，並可透過自有的網路通路銷售產品給消費者。零售商除銷售該產品外，同時銷售不同品牌的相似性商品。製造商與零售商以最大化各自利潤為目標。然而，銷售自有品牌與引進網路通路可能造成產品品牌間與通路間的競爭。為改善整體供應鏈的表現，利益分享契約可能成為合作的機制。本論文探討產品的最佳批發與零售價格、品牌策略與通路結構，更進一步提出相關的管理內涵如:利益分享的契約如何影響製造商與零售商的決策。本研究以Nash及Stackelberg賽局模型描述製造商與零售商的決策順序，並且探討最佳解的存在與唯一性，利用敏感度分析探討模型中相關參數對於最佳解以及製造商與零售商決策的影響。本研究結果顯示開發網路通路與自有品牌有利於製造商與零售商增加利潤，透過利益分享可使雙方同時獲得更高的利潤。為達到雙贏的結果，本研究提出最佳利潤分享的比例以及兩個柏拉圖區間，當利潤分享比例屬於該區間時，品牌與通路的衝突可被緩和，研究結果同時說明製造商與零售商的開發通路與品牌的動機並提供管理者一個以分享利潤為基的合作機制。

關鍵字

供應鏈管理；通路衝突；品牌衝突；定價；賽局；利潤分享契約

並列摘要

Engaging an Internet channel and developing a store brand (SB) are important strategies for manufacturers and retailers to penetrate the market. Numerous researches have focused on the effects of Internet channels and SB products on supply chains, while few studies have discussed the interactions between Internet channels and SB products. This dissertation considers a supply chain with one manufacturer who sells a product to an independent retailer and may sell the product to consumers through an Internet channel. In addition to the manufacturer’s product, the retailer may sell a substitutable product with different brand. Both the manufacturer and the retailer choose their own decision variables to maximize their respective profits. However, these strategies often lead to channel and brand conflicts. To improve the performance of the supply chain, the interest of revenue sharing contract has been increasing in supply chain management. The purpose of this dissertation is to find an optimal retail and wholesale prices, brand strategy and channel structure. Furthermore, this study provides corresponding management insights into how the revenue sharing contract affects the decisions. Nash and Stackelberg game models are formulated and used to represent the decision-making of the manufacturer and retailer. We also derive the corresponding existence and uniqueness conditions for equilibrium solutions. A sensitivity analysis of an optimal decision is conducted for the model parameters and the profits are compared for different scenario settings. The results demonstrate that it would benefit the manufacturer and the retailer to develop of the Internet channel and the SB product, respectively. Furthermore, cooperative strategies exist such that the manufacturer and retailer are beneficial mutually. In order to achieve a win-win outcome for the manufacturer and retailer, we find an optimal revenue sharing ratio and two Pareto zones of revenue sharing ratios, which are Pareto zone of SB and Pareto zone of Internet channel under which the threat of entries of SB and Internet channel could be alleviated. Based on the results, the managerial insights are brought up to account for the motivations of the entries of Internet channels and SB products in supply chains. Moreover, this study provides the coordinate mechanism of the revenue sharing contract for the managers who are interested in introducing an Internet channel or a SB product.

並列關鍵字

Supply chain management ； Channel conflict ； Brand conflict ； Pricing ； Game theory ； Revenue sharing contract

參考文獻

Amrouche, N., & Yan, R. (2012). Implementing online store for national brand competing against private label, Journal of Business Research, 65, 325-332.

Amrouche, N., & Zaccour, G. (2009). A shelf-space-dependent wholesale price when manufacturer and retailer brands compete, OR Spectrum, 31, 361-383.

Ba, S., & Pavlou, P.A. (2002). Evidence of the effect of trust building technology in electronic markets: price premiums and buyer behavior, MIS Quarterly, 26, 243-268.

Ba, S., Stallaert, J., & Zhang, Z. (2007). Price competition in e-tailing under service and recognition differentiation, Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 6, 322-331.

Bakos, Y., & Brynjolfsson, E. (2000). Bundling and competition on the internet, Marketing Science, 19, 63-82.

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考慮品牌策略及通路結構之定價策略

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