具特定身分之人,獲悉未經公開且影響證券價格的重要消息後買賣證券,一般稱為內線交易(insider trading),為我國證券交易法明文禁止。自1988年開始對於內線交易科以刑罰,刑度在2000年、2004年兩度提高,內線交易真禁絕了嗎?不僅案件不斷增加,還因法官、檢察官們對在內線交易構成要件之一,重大消息成立時點看法不一,致內線交易案件經常從開始偵辦時鬧得資本市場沸沸揚揚,到眾人皆已遺忘被告姓名卻仍未定讞。 本論文以案例分析、量化研究兩種方式,歸納釐清檢察官、法官在重大消息認定標準的軌跡。透過案例分析發現,各級法院在企業併購的重大消息何時成立,見解相同部分包括:一、併購會經歷多階段;二、不採特定時點的標準;三、不宜認為萌芽初始階段即成立;四、不宜認為「確定」始成立;五、雙方初步磋商時重大消息尚未成立,但若達成具體共識即為成立。見解歧異部分包括:一、未經實地查核重大消息是否成立;二、董事會通過合併案或換股比例前重大消息是否成立;三、併購契約之重要議題達成協議消息即為成立,惟何謂重要議題並無標準;四、重大消息時點之推論。 相較與企業併購之消息,公司財務業務訊息有顯著不同;併購並非一蹴可幾,而必須經過一連串的程序,何時可認為消息達於明確或成立階段較難認定,故容易出現不同見解;但對公司財務業務訊息而言,公司每日均在運作,因此公司營運之財務業務訊息均隨公司運作而產生。爰隨著時間的經過,公司之財務業務資訊是「客觀存在」之歷史資訊,只要時間經過,公司之財務業務資訊即告「成立」與「確定」。 整理相關案例發現,除和鑫光電、大霸電子、力特光電與明基公司有爭議外,相較企業併購案件,法院間對於公司財務業務訊息類之案件,其重大消息成立時點之認定爭議明顯減少。究其原因,實為公司調降財測的消息成立時點在於公司之營運週期經過,該消息已即客觀上成立、明確;而當公司完成內部營運數據之統計時,其實是內部人實際知悉之時點;前為客觀事實,後為主觀認識,二者截然不同。 實證研究列舉包括:雙方初步接觸、實地查核、簽訂意向書(備忘錄)、雙方對價格形成共識、雙方董事會通過,或是雙方股東大會通過等選項,瞭解司法官對於重大消息何時成立的看法,發現法官、檢察官在選項上看法相似,多數認為須簽訂意向書、備忘錄方能認定重大消息成立。 為瞭解司法官屬性、審級、年資、修習證交法相關學分、承辦內線交易案件與否等個人背景因素與司法官的考慮因素對內線交易重大消息成立時點認定看法的影響,進行迴歸分析發現,法官、檢察官在學(訓)期間所接受證券交易法課程多寡會影響彼等對於「公布後會影響股價」,或是「公布後會影響一般理性投資人的投資意願」應為重大消息的看法。 又透過獨立樣本T檢定發現,法官、檢察官在公布後會影響股價波動為重大消息、公布後會影響一般理性投資人的投資意願為重大消息,具有差異性。不論消息「公布後會影響股價」,或是「公布後會影響一般理性投資人的投資意願」應為重大消息,法官比檢察官較傾向不同意。
Insider trading, defined as a person with a specific identity gaining access to and using non-public information to sell or purchase securities and affecting the market, is prohibited by the Securities and Exchange Act in Taiwan. To prevent insider trading, criminal penalties were established in 1988, and the severity of penalties were increased in 2000 and 2004. However, how successful have these prevention methods been? Not only has the number of insider trading cases been increasing, but the varying perspectives of judges and prosecutors towards material information play an influential role in insider trading cases. Differing opinions then lead to stalled cases, and the accusations go from causing uproar in the capital market at the beginning of the investigation to gradually being forgotten by the public. This thesis analyzes how judges and prosecutors determine the materiality of insider information through case study and quantitative methods. Through case study, the common perspectives towards mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among the various levels in the Court were found to include the following: 1. M&A includes many stages; 2. A standard for a specific point of time has not been established; 3. The initial stage in an M&A should not be used as a point of materiality; 4. “Certainty” about an M&A should not be used as point of materiality; 5. Point of materiality should be when specific agreements have been reached and not during the preliminary consultations between two parties. The points of contentions include: 1. Not checking whether the material information is true; 2. Whether the passing of M&A or stock conversion ratio in a board meeting is considered a point of materiality; 3. Agreement on important issues in M&A Agreements is considered a point of materiality, but there is no standard criteria on what constitutes important issues; 4. Establishing the point of materiality. In comparison to the news of M&A, the information that comes from a company’s financial and business report is different. M&A must go through a series of procedures, thus, it is difficult to establish when the information is clear or material, leading to differing perspectives. However, since the company operates daily, the financial and business information from a company will change according to daily operations. Through the passage of time, a company’s financial and business information can be considered objective historical information, and thus the materiality of the information is established and ascertained. Through study of related cases, excluding the controversial cases of HannsTouch Solution Incorporated, DBTEL Taiwan Limited, Optimax Technology Corporation and BenQ, it can be seen that there is less division in the court’s perspective on the materiality of financial and business information in comparison to M&A cases. The main reason is that the news of the reduction of a company’s financial prediction occurs during its operation time, thus the material information is objectively established and ascertained. Insiders would know the news when the company tallies up internal operational figures. In other words, the former is the objective truth, and the latter is the subjective truth, which are two completely different things. Examples from empirical studies, including initial encounter of both parties, due diligence, signing of documents, agreement on costs, passing of board meetings, or the passing of stockholders meeting, contribute to the understanding of a judge’s perspective towards the materiality of information. It appears that for most judges and prosecutors, the signing of a letter of intent and memorandum is considered materiality of information. In order to understand whether personal background factors, such as judicial characteristics, trial level, annual salary, courses taken on securities and exchange, undertaking cases regarding insider trading, and judicial opinion influence the perspective on the materiality of insider trading, regression analysis was conducted. The results demonstrate that learning about the Securities and Exchange Act affects judges and prosecutors’ perspective on whether to define material information as information that would influence stock prices or investors’ willingness to invest if publicly announced. In addition, the results from the independent samples t-test shows that there is variation in judges’ and prosecutors’ perspectives on defining material information as information that would influence stock prices or investors’ willingness to invest if publicly announced. In fact, judges tend to disagree.