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  • 學位論文

關係企業間不合營業常規交易與交叉持股之研究

A Study on the Non-arm’s Length Transactions and Cross-ownership among Affiliates

指導教授 : 張心悌
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摘要


由於我國關係企業為不法財經犯罪的模式,多以設立起為數甚多的子公司為濫觴,這些子公司有些是設立在海外的紙上公司,有些則是設立在國內和母公司有交叉持股狀態的子公司,這些子公司並不具有任何獨立的價值或是經營考量,而是直接用來作為控制公司不合營業常規交易的工具,亦或先以交叉持股來膨脹表決權,藉由從屬公司所有的控制公司股票,鞏固經營者在控制公司的權力,嗣後即可恣意的行非常規交易以滿足個人私利。職是之故,本論文主要聚焦在在研究關係企業間不合營業常規交易及交叉持股等相關問題之缺失及改正之道,並同時兼論關係企業公司治理之相關之規範,期能強化公司治理中內外部監控機制,以遏止不合營業常規交易及濫用交叉持股情形之發生。 而本論文係採取文獻分析及比較法探討的方式研究之,除了討論我國法目前關於不合營業常規交易的實務運作情形,以及交叉持股之類型、法律效果等有關規範及學者見解外,在不合營業常規交易規範方面係參酌美國法上相關法制,並以之為基礎嘗試提出適用於我國法時可能之規範架構;在交叉持股規範方面並提出美國主要幾州公司法、日本商法對交叉持股、交叉表決權行使的規範與相關文獻,希望藉著比較與分析,能對我國不合營業常規交易之適用予以具體化,同時對交叉持股體系有所助益,並對規範妥適與否作出建議。

並列摘要


This thesis studies the problems of affiliated enterprise, primarily focused on "non-arm's length transactions" and "cross-ownership". Because relations between enterprises (especially controlling-company) can obtain strong operational control by cross-ownership, and if a company's managers not afraid the possibility of failing to fulfill the duty of business was replaced, according to human nature, began to meet self-interest and tunneling , it seems also to be expected. As result, this paper distinction between "non-arm's length transactions" and "cross-ownership", and study on the norms of their respective. Under the legal system in Taiwan, what is "non-arm's length transactions"?although this term lines are scattered in various financial law, the Corporation Law and the Securities Exchange Law not have a clear content. In our current financial practices, tunneling usually by virtue of related party transactions. Therefore, controlling and subsidiary company responsibility of disclosure, has become the protection of minority shareholders and the creditors of subsidiary companies an important issue. At the same time, in our practice, affiliated enterprise cross-ownership situation is quite widespread. Corporations often utilize cross-ownership as a measure to strengthen the management and prevent the board from supervision, and even through cross-ownership in order to gradually transfer the benefit. In order to minimize its shortcomings, Corporation Law generally limited from exercising voting rights and information disclosure . In this paper focuses on analyzing the framework of cross-ownership in Taiwan, and discusses how the regulation of cross-ownership corresponds with the principles of corporate governance, and points out the deficiencies of it.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


劉于萱(2013)。關係人交易—兼論關係企業下之關係人交易〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.00682
林艾淳(2012)。從力霸案論企業利益輸送之防免〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-2408201213404400
洪苡芯(2012)。論關係企業上交叉持股之法律問題研究〔碩士論文,國立臺北大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://www.airitilibrary.com/Article/Detail?DocID=U0023-2808201221263900

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