台灣上市公司總經理相對薪酬之研究

A Study of CEO Pay Slice: The Case of Taiwanese Firms

黃純皜(Chun-Hao Huang)

指導教授 ： 王健合

國立臺北大學/社會科學學院/經濟學系/碩士(2013年)

摘要

本研究欲探討我國上市公司總經理相對薪酬(CPS)與公司績效(Tobin’s q)及會計績效(ROA)之關聯性，金管會於2006年修法放寬薪酬揭露制度後，上市公司皆改採級距方式揭露高階經理人薪資，大幅降低資訊透明度。實證結果顯示Tobin’s q與ROA對CPS並沒有顯著的影響，CPS主要受到總經理是否兼任董事、副總人數，以及異常報酬等經理人權力相關變數的影響。另一方面，在調整CPS內生性以後之實證結果，顯示其對Tobin’s q並沒有顯著影響，實際影響公司績效之因素則是經理人持股比率、研發投入與長期負債比等公司特性變數，尤其在交乘項迴歸結果中顯示，研發投入與經理人兼任董事的比例越高，對公司績效有負向的影響。相似的，迴歸結果顯示CPS對ROA亦無顯著影響，而實際影響會計績效的主要包括公司規模、研發投入、長期負債比與異常報酬，因此我國若能提高薪資揭露的透明度，並且將董事與經理人之職權有效區隔，將能有效提升公司治理。

關鍵字

總經理相對薪酬 ； 公司績效 ； 公司治理

並列摘要

The study investigates the correlation of CEO pay slice (CPS) and Tobin’s q in Taiwan listed companies. After the Securities and Futures Bureau of Taiwan amended the new law in 2006, all of the publicly traded companies in Taiwan changed their disclosure standards to level distance, which reduced the transparency of compensation information in the top management. Empirical results show that Tobin’s q and ROA are not significantly prevalent in the level of CPS. CPS level is most affected by some variables that involve executive power, such as numbers of VPs or CEO Is Only Director. On the other hand, after the author adjusts the endogenous of CPS, the empirical results also displays that CPS does not significantly influence Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is highly influenced by some company feature variables, such as “Insider Ownership”, “R&D” and “Leverage”. Moreover, the cross variable regressions show that, if the proportion of part-time directors is higher, Tobin’s q would be at lower level. Similarly, CPS does not impact ROA significantly. ROA is strongly affected by “Log TA”, “R&D”, “Leverage” and “Abnormal Total Compensation”. These findings demonstrate that we need to promote the compensation transparency and distinguish the authority between executives and directors, which can efficiently improve corporate governance.

並列關鍵字

CEO pay slice (CPS) ； Tobin’s q ； Corporate Governance

參考文獻

林淑惠、胡星陽(2003)，上市公司高階經理人之酬勞研究，經濟論文31, P .171-206。

張瑞當、方俊儒、曾玉琦(2007)，核心代理問題與盈餘管理：董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討，管理學報24, P .17-39。

湯惠雯(2010)，代理問題、決策效率或情境因素-CEO雙重性與公司績效關係在檢測，淡江大學保險學系。

Adams, Renee, Almeida, Heitor, Ferreira, Daniel, (2005) . Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance. Review of Financial Studies 18, 1403–1432.

Baker, George P, and Brian Hall, (2004), CEO Incentives and Firm Size, Journal of Labor Economics 22, 767-798.