管理階層收購之利益衝突防免─兼論「尋購條款(Go-Shops)」之運用

The Prevention of Conflict of Interests in Management Buyouts─Concurrently Discussing the Application of Go-Shops Provision

簡霆霆(Ting-Ting Chien)

指導教授 ： 劉連煜

國立臺北大學/法律學院/法律學系/碩士(2009年)

摘要

在企業併購實務中，管理階層收購(Management Buyout)交易模式在台灣近年來蓬勃發展，然而相關文獻卻相當不足，反觀國際上早已盛行多年並已有許多討論的文獻，本文專文研究關於MBO下利益衝突的問題以釐清MBO交易時「參與MBO團體的管理階層本身」以及「目標公司董事會」所應負之受任人責任，並嘗試建立特別(審議)委員會制度以因應利益衝突的問題，最後結合討論尋購條款之運用，期能為我國在進行MBO交易時的參考。
管理階層收購係由目標公司的管理階層參與併購方，透過互相合作而組成MBO團體，而共同買下目標公司的情形。在我國身兼交易買賣雙方的管理階層通常會參與交易的決策，當參與MBO團體的管理階層之私益與目標公司整體股東之利益不同時，該等管理階層為決策時，有極高的可能性將自己的利益置於公司及整體股東利益之上，此利益衝突的發生將導致損害目標公司及股東利益。且因為該等管理階層握有目標公司機密資訊，可能造成該MBO團體與其他競價者彼此間資訊不對稱的問題，或是其濫用職位所獲知的公司資訊以使自己獲利等道德危險發生。
本文係採用比較法的研究方式，藉由美國德拉瓦州法、英國「城市法規」、香港「公司收購、合併及股份購回守則」為參考對象，檢視我國現行MBO交易的實務以及法規規範，以及對於我國證交所「私募基金來台併購(MBO)我國上市櫃公司較佳實務守則」草案為檢討並提出本文想法。
第二章首先界定管理階層收購主體之認定，以及利益衝突問題的緣由和其負面效果，並針對我國MBO草案為介紹。第三章中針對管理階層收購特性，建構對於「參與MBO團體之管理階層」以及「目標公司董事會」之受任人義務內涵，以作為本文核心基礎的法理依據。第四章中就特別(審議)委員會機制的引入，以因應利益衝突交易的缺失，該委員會之功能會因目標公司董事會是否能客觀為決策，而區分為「建議」或是「決策」不同功能與效果。第五章對於尋購條款的運用會先做概念性與理論背景介紹，提出實證數據說明其功能性以及實務界想法，並針對該條款之缺失提出改善措施，以作為完善我國因應管理階層收購交易之參考。

關鍵字

管理階層收購 ； 利益衝突 ； 受任人義務 ； 特別(審議)委員會 ； 尋購條款

並列摘要

A manager and director’s conflict of interest is a live issue in Management Buyout transaction (Hereinafter refer as MBO) in Taiwan at the moment. It needs to be actively considered in a MBO in which senior managers or directors of a company are involved. When a manager or director finds that his interests do not align with those of the target company and its shareholders, then there will be a conflict of interest, especially caused by the tension between the target’s desire to maximize value for shareholders and the MBO group’s desire to minimize the price paid.
In the Chapter 3, it will be indicated respectively about the fiduciary duties of “MBO managers or directors” and “the board of directors” in MBO. On one hand, an MBO manager or director has fiduciary duties, implied duties as an contractual duties under his contract of appointment. Thus, an MBO manager or director must act in the best interest of the company and its shareholders, with due care and good faith and loyalty; besides, he may not improperly use his position or information to gain an advantage for himself and he shall avoid his voting right in this issue. On the other hand, the board of directors shall act in the best interest of the target company and maximize value for shareholders, shall objectively and independently make a informed decision, shall require the MBO managers or directors to keep the target board informed and to make disclosure to the potential bidders, shall facilitate the independent advices from professional legal and financial advisors, and shall give sufficient information to shareholders to allow them to reach an informed decision.
In the Chapter 4, a “Special Committee” shall be formulated in face of the conflict of interest transaction. All of the members shall be disinterested and independent. The function of the Special Committee is to give the objective advices to the board of directors and shareholders of the target company, and if the Board of directors may not operate due to the fact that most of its members are interested directors or would be controlled by the interested MBO directors or managers, this Committee shall lead the transaction and make negotiation and decision on behalf of the shareholders of the target company.
In the Chapter 5, the basic concepts, the basis theory, and cases about the application of the “Go-Shops provision” would be introduced and further be examined by the statistics in practice indicated by MergerMetics Database and Harvard Prof. Guhan’s researching report. Besides, the defect of this provision would be pointed out and the solutions would be also rendered in order to appeal much more bidders to attend this competition to create the reasonably highest price for the shareholders of the target company.

並列關鍵字

Management Buyout ； conflict of interest ； fiduciary duty ； Special Committee ； Go-Shops

參考文獻

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