論法律的無可決性

A Study Of Legal Indeterminacy

吳東穎(Tung-Ying Wu)

指導教授 ： 莊世同

國立臺北大學/法律學院/法律學系/碩士(2010年)

摘要

法律的無可決性和法治的理念有著重要關聯。法律的無可決性的重要性，除了侵害的法治的理念，也可能會危害法律所重視的個人責任。除此之外，我們對於法律所期待的指引人們行為的功能，也將大為降低。當代法律哲學對於法律是否為無可決的目前仍莫衷一是。即使法律是無可決的，是什麼原因造成法律的無可決性也有許多不同的解釋。本文初步認為法律的無可決性和語言有相當大的關係，它可能是由於語言的本質問題所產生。而在法律哲學中，對於法律的無可決性此一議題，大部分散見於各篇學術期刊中，例如Brian Leiter對於法律無可決性的論述。少部分有專書著述者，例如Brian Bix的博士論文「法律，語言與法律的可決性」。本文將以Bix的「法律，語言與法律的可決性」為基礎，結合Brian Leiter對於法律無可決性的論述，並考慮Ronald Dworkin、Brian Leiter的相關論述，做為通篇論文的研究主軸。
　　本文首先透過Bix對H. L. A. Hart開放文本和簡單案件的論述，進入法律的無可決性此一議題，兼論及Wittgenstein的遵循規則論證。接著本文將介紹Ronald Dworkin捍衛唯一正解的論證。由於唯一正解命題和法律的無可決性有非常緊密的關係。本文認為，若唯一正解命題是正確的，則可以保證法律可以充分的為一個特定法律問題提供唯一一個答案，因此法律是可決的。倘若我們把「沒有唯一正解論點」看作是宣稱：法律有時無法充分的為一個特定法律問題提供唯一一個答案，所以法律是無可決的。如果本文的上述分析是對的，那麼本文Dworkin在「在艱難案件中沒有正確答案嗎？」對於「沒有唯一正解論點」的批評，也可認為是對法律無可決性的批評。之後本文將引入Brian Leiter對於法律無可決性的分析，補足Bix對法律的無可決性的論證之不足。最後本文重新回到唯一正解命題並批評。本文認為，除了Bix所提到的幾種難題是Dworkin的唯一正解命題所難以解決的以外，Dworkin反對含混造成法律的無可決性的論證也是不成功的。在結論中，我認同Leiter的一個建議，亦即法律的無可決性這個問題很大的一部分其實依賴於我們對於法律抱持什麼樣的概念觀。法律無可決性的爭議，其實就是我們對於「法律」這個概念的爭議。

關鍵字

法理學 ； 法律哲學 ； 法律與語言 ； 法律的無可決性

並列摘要

There is a close relationship between legal indeterminacy and the rule of law. The implication of legal indeterminacy is, not only damaging the ideal of the rule of law, but also dangerous to personal responsibility which was emphasized by the rule of law. Besides, there will also be a great regression of the function of the rule of law which is to guide people’s behaviors. Contemporary legal philosophy generally disagrees about whether the law is legally indeterminate. Assuming legal indeterminacy, there are lots of explanation of why the law is legally indeterminate. I argue legal indeterminacy is deeply related to language, that is, it is caused by the nature of language. Among the discussions of this issue, I think, Brian Leiter and Brian Bix have the most remarkable ideas and comments. For example, Leiter’s paper: “Legal Indeterminacy” and Bix’s doctorial dissertation: Law, Language and Legal Determinacy. In this essay I will carefully examine Bix’s doctorial dissertation Law, Language and Legal Determinacy, Leiter’s paper “Legal Indeterminacy” and Ronald Dworkin’s single one right answer thesis, to characterize legal indeterminacy and try to give a correct explanation of it.
In the first place I will begin with Bix’s discussion about H. L. A. Hart’s notion of open texture and easy case, and then Bix’s critics of theorists who utilize Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument to support legal indeterminacy thesis. Next I will articulate Dworkin’s single one right answer thesis from his paper: “Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?” which Dworkin criticized several versions of arguments supporting legal indeterminacy. Before I further investigate Dworkin’s critics over legal indeterminacy thesis, I introduce Leiter’s clarification of legal indeterminacy thesis. He separates different versions of legal indeterminacy thesis and develops a very clear theory of legal indeterminacy thesis. In his theory, he argues legal indeterminacy is a phenomenon in which a set of legal reasons could not justifies a single one right outcome in certain legal cases. I then endorse his theory and of legal indeterminacy thesis and utilize it with Bix’s theory to criticize Dworkin’s single one right answer thesis. In addition to Bix’s several considerations which Dworkin’s single one right answer thesis can’t accommodate, I argue Dworkin’s objection to the theory which holds that vagueness causes legal indeterminacy is not successful as well. In the end, I endorse Leiter’s suggestion that the debate over legal indeterminacy actually in a very large part depends on what conception we have about law.

並列關鍵字

Jurisprudence ； Philosophy of Law ； Law and Language ； Legal Indeterminacy

參考文獻

1. Audi, Robert, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, second edition, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

4. Bix, Brian, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context, Sweet and Maxwell, 2006.

5. Bix, Brian, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993.

7. Brink, David, Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.

12. Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1978.