「捕蠅紙效果(Flypaper Effect)」指政府增加1單位一般型補助款時所帶動的地方政府支出會大於當地居民所得增加1單位所帶動的地上政府支出, Inman(2008)將造成捕蠅紙效果之成因加以彙總,其中包含未將計畫型補助款(project grants)外生化、遺漏重要變數、財政幻覺及選民與選民官員之政治契約等因素,並說明國外許多學者實證研究認為「捕蠅紙效果」為普遍存在之財政現象,然而國內學者對臺灣地區進行之實證分析所得的結果則較不一致。 於我國單一財政制度背景下,利用1986到2007年臺灣21縣市之地方財政收支、社會經濟變數,進行縱橫資料(panel data)之迴歸分析,以Nagamine(1995)之「地方政府代理行為模式(behavioral model of a local government agency)」為理論模型依據,將我國地方財政分成兩種模型,模型一為「地方政府具完全資源配置自主權」即多數學者討論捕蠅紙效果之傳統模型,模型二為Nagamine修改後的「地方政府不完全資源分配權力」,並將政治因素及社會經濟變數納入本文修正後之理論模型中,探討臺灣地區財政制度在納入政治因素考量後之地方政府支出模型是否呈現「捕蠅紙效果」。 實證結果顯示,在模型1之下不論有無政治因素皆存在捕蠅紙效果,而修正後之模型2則皆無捕蠅紙效果,雖納入政治因素對捕蠅紙效果之結果並沒改變,但對捕蠅紙效果之程度上卻有所增加;依此結果本文斷定,地方政府具有資源配置自主權與否為捕蠅紙效果存在與否的主因,而政治因素為影響此效果程度大小之因素。由此可知中央政府若欲減少地方財政赤字,彌平地方財源短詘,應鼓勵地方政府減少對中央補助款之依賴,增加自有財源,以減少「憚收、濫支」的情況。
The definition of flypaper effect is that when the central government increases one unit of general grants to the local government, it stimulates more local government spending than one unit of increase in citizen income. Inman (2008) summarized potential explanations for the flypaper effect from international studies, such as unexogenous project grant, omission of substantial variables, fiscal illusion and the politic contract of voters and candidates. Empirical studies by many researchers have shown that the flypaper effect is a common phenomenon in many countries; however, studies in Taiwan have so far been inconclusive. The purpose of this study is to determine the types of public financial and political circumstances that may induce the flypaper effect. This study investigated local public expenditures of 21 counties and cities in Taiwan; regression analysis on panel data was used and two empirical specifications were produced, based on the behavioral model of a local government agency proposed by Nagamine (1995). The first model is “Local government with full autonomy in the allocation of resources”, which was most commonly used in the investigation of flypaper effects; and the second model, revised by Nagmine, is “Local government authority does not have full autonomy in the allocation of resources”. Political and socio-economic factors were incorporated into both models in order to determine their effect on the occurrence of the flypaper effect in local government expenditure. Results of the study show that the flypaper effect always occurred under the traditional model (specification one), with or without political factors. There was no flypaper effect under the second specification, although political factors appeared to contribute to the extent to which the flypaper effect may occur. According to the results, whether or not the local government has the autonomy to allocate resources is the main determinant of the flypaper effect in Taiwan; the extent of the flypaper effect is influenced by political factors. In conclusion, if the central government wants to reduce the deficit of local governments, it should encourage local governments not to rely on grants from the central government.