過去的研究通常探討:製造業或一般產業的盈餘管理對高階管理者之薪酬與公司績效(Pay-for-Performance)的關係,金融業的議題常被排除在外。然而,金融業所牽連的層面甚廣,本文研究之目的係了解探討美國高階管理者之薪酬與公司績效(Pay-for-Performance)的關係,進一步了解薪酬績效敏感性 (Pay-Performance Sensitivity)的高低是否會影響管理當局運用會計原則之彈性來進行盈餘管理,在金融業是否存在盈餘管理的現象?金融業是否會為了避免報導盈餘損失,進而操縱裁決性應計項目 (Discretionary Accrual,簡稱DA)提高公司帳面盈餘?而PPS與盈餘未達水準的雙重誘因,是否更會誘使高階管理者進行盈餘餘管理的行為? 實證結果為:(一)會計績效與高階主管薪酬呈顯著正相關,而與市場績效呈現無顯著相關;(二)當薪酬績效敏感性愈高時,裁決性應計項目也愈大,美國金融業的CEO為了維持激勵性薪酬契約(Incentive-based Contract)的水準,將會進行盈餘管理;(三)為了避免盈餘未達預期目標,將會進行裁決性應計項目(Discretionary Accrual, 簡稱DA)的操縱,使帳面盈餘為正,避免報導盈餘為負;(四)雙重誘因(高PPS與盈餘未達水準)的存在,更容易誘使CEO從事盈餘管理的行為。
Most of the studies that investigated the relationship between pay-for- performance and earnings management focused on the manufacturing and general industries excluded the financial sectors. The purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship among CEO compensation, corporate performance and earnings management. Are the relationship between CEO compensation and corporate performance related to each other? Does the PPS (Pay-Performance Sensitivity) will enhance the CEO to manipulate the discretionary Accruals ( DA)? Would they avoid the earning loss to achieve the target of expected earning and manipulate the DA? The result of this study shows as follows:CEO compensation has positive relationship with accounting-based performance, but negative with marketing-based performance. Not surprisingly, PPS has a great impact on DA, the relationship between PPS and DA are related positively. And furthermore, evidence shows that CEO will manipulate the discretionary accrual to achieve the goal of ideal earnings. Finally, the further evidence shows that CEO has greater incentive to manipulate the discretionary accruals when higher PPS is coupled with loss and earnings decreases.