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DISCRETIONARY PENSION ASSUMPTION CHOICES, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN

摘要


This study examines how corporate governance affects earnings management through discretionary pension assumption choices. We provide empirical evidence in the Taiwanese setting showing that pension assumption choices are significantly associated with weaker corporate governance. Our findings indicate that the opacity inherent in pension accounting guidance in this setting is exacerbated for firms with poor corporate governance. Specifically, results show that the deviation between control rights and cash flow rights, the number of board seats held by the ultimate controller, and chief executive officer (CEO) duality are significantly associated with more aggressive salary growth rate and/or rate of return on pension assets assumption choices. In addition, our results suggest that board independence and institutional shareholders play important monitoring roles, which can mitigate opportunistic discretionary pension assumption choices.

參考文獻


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