董事會特性與資訊不對稱

Board Characteristics and Information Asymmetry

吳佩芸(Pei-Yun Wu)

指導教授 ： 廖益興

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2010年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201000349

摘要

多數文獻探討銀行持股進入借款企業董事會，著重對於放款或企業經營績效與企業價值之影響，並且認為銀行進入借款企業董事會會降低銀行與該企業間的資訊不對稱，卻鮮少有文獻探討銀行持股且進入借款企業董事會後，是否能降低借款企業與外部投資人之間的資訊不對稱，故本研究朝此議題探討之。首先，利用企業特性與銀行進入企業董事會、銀行持有企業股權及銀行在企業董事會席次比例的關係估計三項配適值，再以此配適值與資訊不對稱程度衡量銀行有無進入董事會、銀行持股比例及銀行佔董事會席次比例對企業與外部投資人間資訊不對稱之影響。本研究實證結果顯示當有銀行進入企業董事會、銀行持有企業股票愈多、銀行佔企業董事會席次比例愈高時，銀行的公信力確實會降低該企業與外部投資人之間的資訊不對稱程度，故與本研究之假說一致。此外，本研究刪去資訊不對稱程度前後1%以進行敏感性測試，其結果亦與實證相符。本研究有助於一般外部投資人進行投資規劃時，能盡可能選擇有銀行進入之企業，一來外部投資人取得該企業資訊較為容易，其次銀行能代替外部投資人提供較謹慎的監督功能，此為本文之研究貢獻。

關鍵字

企業董事會 ； 銀行持股 ； 銀行 ； 資訊不對稱

並列摘要

Most previous literature on banks holding shares and participating boards mainly focuses on the impact to bank loan, company performance and business value; and generally considers banks’ participation is helpful in reducing the information asymmetry between banks and firms. Relatively, little research investigates whether banks holding shares and participating boards can reduce the information asymmetry between external investors and firms. Therefore, the author tries to conduct research in this direction. Firstly, the author estimates three fitted values from the relationship between enterprise characteristics and banks’ participation on boards, share holding and proportion of board seats. Then, the author uses the fitted values and the level of information asymmetry to measure the effects of banks’ participation, holding and proportion on the information asymmetry between external investors and firms. As the empirical results show, banks do build confidence and reduce information asymmetry between external investors and firms by entering the boards of directors, holding more firm shares and keeping more seats on boards of directors. The results are consistent with the hypothesis in this study. In addition, this study deletes one percent of value from the top and the bottom of information asymmetry degree for sensitivity test. The results are also consistent with the empirical results. The contribution of this study is to reveal that common external investors should do their best to select firms with banks’ participation during the investment plan. Because external investors can more easily obtain information from these firms, and the banks will carefully supervise these firms just like in the shoes of external investors.

並列關鍵字

Bank holding ； Bank ； Information asymmetry ； Boards of directors

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