強制性董監責任險對公司治理評鑑之影響

本文以首次強制性投保董監事及重要職員責任保險之上市（櫃）公司為研究對象，並以次序邏輯迴歸方法進行檢驗，探討首次強制性投保董監責任險對公司治理評鑑之影響。實證結果顯示公司首次強制性投保董監事責任險，並未能有效強化公司治理。本文進一步比較家族企業與非家族企業於首次強制性投保董監責任險，對公司治理評鑑結果之影響是否存在顯著差異。實證結果顯示無論家族企業或非家族企業於首次強制性投保董監事責任險，皆對公司治理評鑑結果並無顯著相關。接著，本文比較電子業與非電子業於首次強制性投保董監責任險，對公司治理評鑑結果之影響是否存在顯著差異。實證結果顯示無論電子業或非電子業，皆對公司治理評鑑結果並不具顯著相關性。

關鍵字

董監責任險；公司治理評鑑；家族企業

並列摘要

In this paper, the listed (over-the-counter) companies with the first mandatory directors and officers liability insurance are taken as the research object, and the ordered logistic regression method is used to test the impact of the first mandatory directors and officers liability insurance on the corporate governance evaluation system. The empirical results show that the mandatory directors and officers liability insurance for the first time does not effectively strengthen corporate governance. This paper further compares whether there are significant differences between family business and non-family business in the impact of mandatory directors and officers liability insurance on corporate governance evaluation system results. The empirical results show that whether the family business or non-family business in the first mandatory directors and officers liability directors and officers liability insurance, there is no significant correlation between corporate governance evaluation system results. Then, this paper compares the electronic industry and non-electronic industry in the first mandatory directors and officers liability insurance, whether there are significant differences in the impact of corporate governance evaluation system results. The empirical results show that no matter in the electronic industry or non-electronic industry, there is no significant correlation between the evaluation results of the corporate governance system.