Most modern states have a document called ”constitution.” Writing a new constitution or revising an existing one is seen by many emerging democracies as an important gesture proclaiming their condemnation of the authoritarian and backward past. In order to separate from the past, these constitutions acquire legitimacy through popular support. Nevertheless, too much emphasis on popular support overlooks an important fact: that a constitution was originally developed to restrict political power, including the power wielded by the majority. Taiwan is a heterogeneous, even divided, society, yet it follows a similar approach in its constitutional reform. As a result, the constitution may be revised with a majority vote, at least on the surface, yet failing to assure the minority rights has raised doubt on its legitimacy. Many attribute this constitutional instability to the national identity division. They argue that a reasonable constitutional order would be out of the question before a consensus on national identity can be realized. Yet, this article believes that the reverse is also true: national identity would be difficult to consolidate without a respectable constitutional structure. To the chagrin of the author, many in Taiwanese society try to strengthen national identity by giving more constitutional power to the majority, which, seems to the author, weakens respect for the constitution. As the vicious cycle illustrates, society has been further divided as constitutional revisions occurred one after another.