本研究以2005至2013年台灣上市公司為研究對象,針對台灣經濟新報資料庫(TEJ)整理之台灣電子產業與非電子產業資料,透過panel data以及SPSS統計軟體之敘述性統計、相關分析與複迴歸模型分析,探討台灣上市公司所有權結構(外圈、內圈、核心圈)與利益同化(席次股份偏離情形、家族化程度)對企業價值、財務績效、董監事與高階人員薪酬之影響。在理論觀點上,本研究有別於代理理論(agency theory)與管家理論(stewardship theory),採用個人理性的微觀基礎(micro foundation)作為立論前提,從個人層面及家族企業之家族面與企業面的雙元系統模型切入,以組織結構的差序性觀點發展出所有權結構,並進一步對公司治理議題中之效率監督(efficiency monitoring; 由外而內)與利益同化(interest assimilation; 由內而外)的動態互動情形進行延伸探討,充分反應出台灣社會特殊的股權結構與管理型態,強化對台灣上市公司有關公司治理議題之解釋,以補充核心代理問題及管家理論單方面分析上的不足。
This research examines the listed companies in Taiwan, both electronics industries and non-electronics industries, sorted with Multiple Regression Analysis by SPSS taken from the 2005-2013 archives of the Taiwan Economic Journal. We investigate the companies' various ownership structures and determine how these structures (the outer circle, the inner circle, and the core circle) affect corporate value as well as compensation for directors, supervisors, and high-level managers. We employ the concept of the family-enterprise dual system as the pivotal point in developing our hypothesis: Differing degrees of intimacy within the ownership structure influences enterprise value and high-level personnel compensation. Furthermore, this research investigates efficiency monitoring (from outer to inner) and interest assimilation (from inner to outer) in Taiwanese corporate governance. The goal of this research is to better explain the relationships among the ownership structure, enterprise value, and management compensation, and to supplement an insufficiency in other published literatures of agency theory as well as stewardship theory.