固樁或擴張？市議員地方建設建議事項的運用策略

Maintaining or Expanding Support Bases? Local Councilors' Distributive Strategies of Local Infrastructure Expenditures

李思婷(Sih-ting Li)

《選舉研究》 29卷1期 (2022/05) Pp. 31-67

https://doi.org/10.6612/tjes.202205_29(1).0002

摘要

將資源分配給誰始終是至關重要的分配政治議題。然而過去臺灣分配政治研究多以正副總統、中央政府、立法委員以及縣市首長為主，鮮少關注地方議員在選區內部的資源分配情形。本文以第十二屆臺北市議員所提地方建設建議事項為例，旨在探討以尋求連任為目標的理性議員會如何分配公共資源。市議員會採取防守型的固樁策略，選擇將資源回饋給既有支持者，抑或採取進擊型的拓展選票策略？本研究將分配機制就概念上區分為「分配與否」以及「分配多寡」兩個面向。由多層Tobit迴歸分析結果顯示，在分配與否的模型中，市議員傾向運用防守型策略鞏固既有支持基礎。不過，在分配多寡的面向中，無論各里對市議員的重要程度是高是低，資源分配量並未存在顯著差異。然而資源固樁的結論並未因此推翻，反而打破了一般既定印象。整體而言，市議員運用建設固樁的機制應從金額犒賞修正為有所回饋，市議員雖會特別照顧核心支持者或重要里長的需求，積極向市府爭取建設，但不會因此讓該地獲得超高額建設，顯示市議員對於那些相形重要的地區不會再特別給予差別待遇。

關鍵字

分配政治 ； 肉桶政治 ； 地方議員 ； 地方建設建議事項 ； 多層次分析

並列摘要

One of the most important debates in the distributive politics literature is who receives allocation. Previous studies on Taiwan's distributive politics have examined predominantly the role played by the president, legislators and the local governments. The distributive strategies of local councilors, however, have been overlooked. Few explain the variations in the amount of resources within councilors' electoral districts. Using data on local infrastructure expenditures by the 12 Taipei City councilors, this study investigates how rational politicians allocate infrastructure resources in order to maximize the probabilities of reelection, and whether local councilors use resources to reward their core supporters or to expand their support bases. We identify two dimensions-whether to allocate and the amount of money spent by councilors - to the mechanisms of resource allocation. Based on multilevel Tobit regression analysis, we first examine whether councilors tend to favor important sub-constituencies or not. The results indicate that councilors do reward their core supporters with public resources to maintain their electoral bases. However, there is no significant difference in the amount of resources no matter how important the area is. Overall, our findings support the core hypothesis and point out that the allocation mechanism of city councilors should be revised.

並列關鍵字

distributive politics ； pork barrel politics ； local councilor ； local infrastructure expenditures ； multilevel analysis

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