我國中央政府體制自2000年起第一次政黨輪替,至2008年第二次政黨輪替,及第七屆立法委員選舉制度的改變等等政治生態產生巨大變化以來,行政院與立法院的權力分配出現轉變,立法院行使監督資源配置的預算審議,在不同政府形態下(一致或分立政府)如何審議?是否有因政府形態的不同而產生什麼樣的變化與影響?結果有無不同?是本文所要研究探討的。 本文從探討現行憲政制度與行政、立法關係,檢視分立政府與一致政府時期我國國會之政治運作面向與影響預算審議因素,再將中央政府90至100年度歲入與歲出總預算審議實際運作分單一與總體兩個面向,單一面向係從個別部會之委員會預算審查與院會預算審議刪減數比較、預算刪減率與預算凍結率比較並作部會間之比較做分析討論;總體面向係從整體公務預算探討委員會與院會審議情形,再進一步將單一與總體作一比較分析。亦即在預算審查的過程中將個別委員會審查、朝野協商過程做一動態深度剖析,並佐以深度訪談。 研究發現:就立法院審議中央政府90至100年度公務預算,整體而言,90至97年度分立政府時期預算審議,相當程度存在著如同Sundquist為首的傳統學派所主張分立政府較一致政府易造成行政立法預算僵局(包括歲入預算大幅刪減、歲出預算遭凍結比例很高、分立政府時期個別部會預算審議僵局高於整體總預算、不同部會在分立與一致政府時期之預算,其預算刪減數及凍結情形亦會有不同、朝野黨團協商成為預算審議的主戰場、預算主決議內容有差異),但細分下又不那麼全然,就歲出刪減比例而言則如同Mayhew為首的學派研究,並未顯示分立政府與一致政府的差異。 因分立政府時期預算審議,朝野政黨常流於意識形態之爭,預算審議重點常放在朝野對立之公共政策、相關業務計畫與在野黨敵對的部會,以致於總預算案往往成為政治角力的犧牲品,所以分立政府會是形成預算僵局的因素之一。然在民生或討好選民的議題上,往往執政與在野委員立場一致。從另一角度而言,也可以說,一致政府或分立政府時期立法院審議中央政府總預算案,有時是沒有執政與在野之分,只有總統行政權與立法權對抗。
The political regime of the Republic of China had been changed dramatically ever since the party alternation in power happened in the year of 2000, 2008 and the election system reform adopted by the seventh Legislative Yuan. Above factors not only converted but also allocated the state of political power between the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan. Accordingly, this paper will be focused on: How the Legislative Yuan should exercise her oversight power in reviewing the budgetary bills under different forms of government; either a unified or divided government? Moreover, what kind of transformation or influence might be caused by so called different forms of government? Or could the results be different in that sense? It is found that when the Legislative Yuan reviewed the governmental agency’s budgetary proposals during the period of 2001 to 2011, the so call deadlocks; between the Executive and Legislative power was tend to be relatively apparent especially under a divided government rather than a unified one from 2001 to 2008. Above mentioned deadlocks; including the annual revenue was deducted tremendously, a large proportion of the annual expenditure was blocked, more bottlenecks can be easily come to when review a individual governmental agency’s budgetary bills than the general budget under a divided government, different agencies might have to face different subtract amount and frozen situation during a divided or unified government ruling period, caucus meetings become the major battle field whenever the budget examination involved, and differences exist among the same principal resolutions on the same agency’s budgetary bill. However, to define even further, the situation might not be like that. the deductive percentages of the annual expenditure, were not so distinctive under a divided and unified governmental ruling period.