本研究旨在探討公司績效、公司治理機制對總經理薪酬的影響為何?並探討動態環境對『公司治理機制與總經理薪酬』間關係有何調節效果?本研究以2004年至2009年806個公司為研究樣本,實證結果發現:會計績效(市場績效)指標對總經理薪酬為顯著正向(負向)影響,在動態環境下,會計績效(市場績效)與總經理薪酬間的正向(負向)關係較敏感。 在公司治理變數中,總經理持股率、總經理為控制家族成員對總經理薪酬均為顯著正向影響,但前者與總經理薪酬間的關係在靜態期間較敏感,後者與總經理薪酬間的關係在動態期間較敏感。董事長兼任總經理、董事會規模對總經理薪酬均為正向但不顯著的影響,動態期間增強『董事長兼任總經理對總經理薪酬』間的正向關係;但減弱了『董事會規模對總經理薪酬』間的正向關係。 獨立董事比率、獨立監察人比率對總經理薪酬均為不顯著的正向影響,動態期間減弱了『獨立董事比率對總經理薪酬』間的正向關係;動態期間增強了『獨立監察人比率對總經理薪酬』間的正向關係;是否存在大股東、法人機構持股率對總經理薪酬均為不顯著的正向影響,動態期間減弱了『是否存在大股東對總經理薪酬』與『法人機構持股率對總經理薪酬』間的正向關係。 本研究的貢獻在兩方面:第一,補充了公司績效、公司治理機制對總經理薪酬的影響之實證證據;第二,驗證了動態環境下,公司治理機制與總經理薪酬間關係間是否存在調節效果。
This paper examines the effects of firm performance, corporate governance mechanism on CEOs compensation, which is an important issue in recent. Further, this study argues that the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and CEO compensation is moderated by dynamic environment in which firms operate. We use 806 Taiwan listed firms to be our samples during 2004 to 2009. In the empirical analysis, we find that there exists significantly positive (negative) association between firm accounting (market) performance and CEO compensation. However, there relationship will enhance under dynamic environment. CEO compensation will increase when CEO shareholdings increase or CEO is member of controlled family. The relationship of former (latter) is more sensitive during stable (dynamic ) environment. In addition, chairman compensation is higher under chairman is also CEO or the size of board of directors is bigger. The relationship of former is more sensitive during dynamic environment, the relationship of latter will weaken in dynamic environment. Both independent directors ratio and independent supervisors ratio have insignificantly positive effect on CEO compensation. The relationship of former is weaken in dynamic environment, while the latter is more sensitive during dynamic environment. Whether there exists outside blockholders and institutional shareholdings have insignificantly positive effect on CEO compensation. . The relationship of former and latter are both weaken in dynamic environment. The contributions of this research include second fold: First, it provides evidence that the impact of corporate performance, corporate governance mechanisms on CEO compensation. Second, we provide the moderating effect of dynamic environment on the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and CEO compensation