在基於多國籍企業總部與其從屬公司之間存在著明顯的資訊不對稱情況下,本研究採用實質選擇權方法論來探索代理問題如何影響風險專案計劃的價值。 我們詳實的描繪出四個個案情況,以此來顯示風險專案計劃品質和從屬公司管理階層的努力程度在分別處於具有可辨別和不可辨別兩種不同條件下的情況。更進一步探索此四個個案將對風險專案計劃的價值產生不同程度的影響。 根據本研究的研究結果顯示,在資訊不對稱的情況下,不同的誘因方案(如薪資和利潤分享因子) ,會導致多國籍企業總部所作資源分配決策暨從屬公司管理階層的努力程度上產生不同的結果,且最終會將此結果反應至該企業風險專案計劃的價值上。
The information asymmetry is obvious between headquarters and subsidiary management of an MNE. In this study we explore the impact of the agency problems upon the value of the risky project which is based on the real options approach. We develop four cases to explicate how the valuation of the risky project is influence under different conditions which specific observability of the both quality of the risky project and the effort devoted by the subsidiary management. The consequence shows that under asymmetric information situation various incentive schemes setting the wage and a profit sharing component result in different capital allocation and managerial effort then ultimately affect to the value of the risky project.