論履行請求權之排除
－從英美法、日本債法改正以及賽局理論之觀點－

王柏霳

doi:10.6342/NTU.2014.00640

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論履行請求權之排除－從英美法、日本債法改正以及賽局理論之觀點－

On the Limits of Specific Performance From Common Law, the Modernization of Japanese Contract Law and Game Theory Perspectives

王柏霳 , Masters　　Advisor：陳自強　　

繁體中文 DOI： 10.6342/NTU.2014.00640

賽局理論；原定給付履行；英美法；大陸法；給付不能；契約頓挫；損害輕減義務； Game Theory ； Specific Performance ； Common Law ； Civil Law ； Impossibility ； Frustration ； Mitigation Rule

Abstract │ Reference (222) │ Altmetrics

Abstract 〈TOP〉

給付不能係屬我國債務不履行三大態樣之一，於判斷流程上，係先判斷債務不履行之態樣為何，爾後決定該務不履行之態樣是否可「歸責」於債務人，因此所謂之給付不能，其意涵有其多義性，可類比至英美法之契約頓挫（frustration of contract），亦可能類比至英美法之原定給付履行（specifc performance）之否准，換言之，對於給付不能之研究上，由於我國思考脈絡之因素（先判斷給付是否不能，再決定是否可以歸責），於比較法之研究之上，「給付不能」一語容易混雜上開兩概念。然依本文觀察，契約頓挫理論與原定給付履行之否准係處於不同層次之議題，前者所涉及之因素包含契約解釋以及契約風險之分配之議題，後者則涉及風險分配確定後如何調整契約雙方當事人雙方責任、利益之問題，此二議題之區格由於我國思考脈絡之因素，似並非明顯，不論如何，本文所著重者在於後者，亦即原定給付履行之否准之議題，對於前者之議題之詳盡分析，讀者可見，唐仲慶「作為免責事由之給付不能－以比較法研究為中心－」國立臺灣大學碩士論文，指導教授為陳自強先生。
	按給付不能之要件，不論係採取形式不能抑或社會通念不能，我國學說多以債務人負擔過重作為依據，此於免責之契約受挫之脈絡之上，較無問題存在，然於可歸責之脈絡之上，給付不能係作為排除債權人履行請求權之重要關卡，此時「債權人因債務人原定履行所可以獲得之利益之討論」則於「債務人負擔過重」此一上位概念之陰影之下，消失無蹤。
	另，於種類之債，我國學說多以種類之債並無給付不能之問題作結，此點多係基於「種類之物」之市場流通性而定論，然而此點於比較法（英美法）之觀點上，係屬相當罕見。
	除實體法上之給付不能，我國執行法上，針對債務人原定履行之執行（除金錢債務），設有代替執行，學說、實務亦有肯定「代償執行」者，此時執行金額之計算之基準時點，多係以執行當下之物價或勞務價格為準，此時債權人可以透過履行請求權之行使而規避損害減輕義務。此外，即便可以強制履行者，不一定代表可以強制執行，例如典型之夫妻同居義務，係屬不得強制執行者，然其理由係基於「人性尊嚴」之模糊一語。
	有鑑於此，本文嘗試就英美法之觀點以及日本債法改正脈絡，進行分析以及比對，希望能透過不修法之方式，將我國民法與國際潮流接軌。
	另，針對英美法之本身，實務上長年以來已經有一套定型化之判斷標準，然而，學說對此爭議不斷，本文嘗試借用經濟學之觀點分析英美法之判斷模式，並予以論證，希望能加深英美法系統之合理性，並提供一套判斷標準，以供我國未來實務使用。

Parallel Abstract 〈TOP〉

The impossibility of performance constitutes an important type of non-perforamnce in Civil Law. In the stream of thinking thereof, Civil Law lawyers usually start with classifying the types of the disputed non-performance, after which they will usually take the second stance to decide whether the specific type of “non-performance” is attributable to the obligor (debtor) or not. However, it is not the case in Common Law, Common Law lawyers don’t differentiate between types of non-performance, nor do they impose the notion of “attributable”. As long as the debtor fails to comply with the contract terms, itself is de facto in default, except where frustration occurs as a form of creating the impossibility. However, this kind of “impossibility” is different to that in Civil Law in that the Common Law’s notion of impossibility automatically negates each party’s obligation under the contract. Therefore it is nature for us to connect Common Law’s notion of “frustration” with Civil Law’s “non-attributable impossibility”. However, what is the Common Law’s counterpart for “attributable impossibility” in Civil Law? In fact, there exists such thing as the limit to the specific performance in Common Law. This limit also negates the obligation of the debtor and transforms it into monetary compensation, which has the same effect where the impossibily is attributable to the debtor in Civil Law, namely monetary compensation again. Why are these two systems diversing so badly in theory? It is because Civil Law and Common Law have different “thinking procedures” which probably derives from different legal angles. A poor, less precise but necessary explanation is that Common Law starts with “attributibility” and then “impossibility”, whereas Civil Law conversely starts with “impossibility” and then “attributibility”. It is a simple game of permutation of ideology, yet the most bewildering to all lawyers. 
	However, the above explanation does not guranttee a substantial homogeneity between these two systems. As you may know, Common Law take the stance of prioritizing monetary relief whereas Civil Law adheres to specific performance more vigorously. A simple example is that for a creditor of generic goods, it usually is permited to obtain what it truly wants under Civil Law, however it will face hinderance under Common Law. In the latter case, it better goes through monetary relief. The reason for Civl Law to permit specifc performace of generic good is that there is no such notion of impossibility in generic goods. However, for Common Law, the notion of impossibility is being replaced by the notion of “the limit to specifc perforamce”, and thus provides more flexibility. In general, when the object is a generic good, the creditor is usually expected to engane in substituional transaction. In fact, they usually will even without the saying of the law. In the eye of Civil Law, Common Law imposes an impossibility to generic goods, which is of course unthinkable to Civil Law. 
	Concerning this discrepancy, economists have already landed on this issue several decades ago. Yet no clear conclusion seems to be reached partly due to disagreement among different assumptions. However, this article tends to reopen the issue with a different tool, namely game theory. In the core of this article, the consecutive interplays between players (debtor and creditor) under the legal structure form a perfect sequential game with exact timing on it. By using this economic tool, we can examine how each player will interact when the court adopts different policies (say, Commonl Law method or Civil Law method) and how payoffs alters thereof. Once this platform is set up, the court can examine which method fits into the current case and make decision for the best outcomes (the outcome that maximizes the payoffs for both parties). The logic used here is “backward induction”. As it may be criticized, another alternative logic can be used here is replicator equation in the evolution game theory. However, it would be tremendously unreadable to lawyers. So we will stick to backward induction for the time being. Another thing needed to be noted is that, during the set up of the model, different assumptions may cause different models to emerge. And different models WILL LEAD to different conclusions EVEN WHEN we are using the same logic to analysis the same case. So the choosing of assumptions is crucial and should be flexible. When the assumptions are more realistic and more in number, the model derived thereof should be more convincing and so is the conclusion.
	After trying to apply economics tools into law, this article finds that Common Law method fits more into the welfare of the both parties under certain assumptions. In the end, this article establish a convenient board for lawyers to examine the outcome of each case although the process is paintaking and less elegant. This article hopes there would be a better and smarter mathematical solution to this paintaking process.

Reference ( 222 ) 〈TOP〉

唐仲慶（2011），（作為免責事由之給付不能－以比較法研究為中心－〔Impossibility and force majeure as exemptions : focus on the comparative legal study〕），碩士論文－國立臺灣大學法律學研究所。
連結：
H. G. Beale、W. D. Bishop、M. P. Furmston, Contract : cases and materials (1990, 2th ed), London︰Butterworth。
連結：
Steven J. Burton, Principles of contract law (2006, 3th ed), St. Paul, Minn.︰Thomson/West。
連結：
John Cartwright, Contract law : an introduction to the English law of contract for the civil lawyer (2007, 1th ed), Portland, Or.︰Hart Publishing。
連結：
Joseph Chitty、H. G. Beale, Chitty on contracts (2012, 29th ed), London︰Thomson Reuters。
連結：

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