總經理管理任期對企業不當作為之影響：以台灣半導體企業為例

Does CEO Career Horizon Lead to Corporate Misconduct? Evidence of Taiwanese Semiconductor Firms

李振宇(Cheng-Yu Lee) ； 吳學良(Hsueh-Liang Wu) ； 李佳蓉(Chia-Jung Lee)

《臺大管理論叢》 28卷3期 (2018/12) Pp. 145-176

https://doi.org/10.6226/NTUMR.201812_28(3).0005

摘要

隨著企業社會責任的愈受重視，實務與學術界不斷關注對企業不當作為的成因與後果。根據相關理論與實證研究，總經理管理任期被認為對企業營運決策的良窳有著高度的關連。爰此，本研究進一步探討總經理管理任期是否對於企業不當作為產生影響。本研究利用台灣半導體產業作為研究對象，根據1,124筆公司－年資料的分析結果，發現總經理管理任期與企業不當作為之間存在著非線性的倒U型關係。為降低企業不當作為發生的機率，本研究進一步考量董事會治理的調和作用，研究結果顯示（1）董事會規模的增加對於總經理管理任期在企業不當作為的影響無顯著調和效果；（2）董事會成員的功能背景之多樣化能夠有效緩解總經理管理任期與企業不當作為之關係。綜上，本研究之研究成果進一步填補相關文獻在探討企業不當作為上的不足。

關鍵字

總經理管理任期 ； 企業不當作為 ； 董事會規模 ； 董事背景多樣性

並列摘要

In the wake of corporate social responsibility, the academia and practitioners are increasingly concerned with the causes and consequences of corporate misconduct. Among theoretical and empirical probes into the issue, a CEO's career horizon is thought to be a key factor of the quality of executive decision making. In a sample of 1,124 firm-year observations in semiconductor industry in Taiwan, the study argues that CEO career horizon has an inverted-U effect on the incidence of corporate misconduct. Further considering the monitoring roles of board size and board functional diversity, we found that a board with members from diverse functional backgrounds is better able to mitigate the detrimental effect of CEO career horizon on corporate misconduct rather than a large-sized board. This study contributes to the literature by highlighting the critical roles of CEOs and boards in corporate irresponsible behavior.

並列關鍵字

CEO career horizon ； corporate misconduct ； board size ； board functional diversity

參考文獻

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