政策強制、地方政府行為與基層民主－對中國大陸村莊自治的理論分析

本文針對當前中國大陸農村的主要現象－村莊基層民主選舉和農村稅費問題加以分析。透過分析可以發現，問題的根源在於中共實行之強制政策，不但加重農民負擔，進而限制了農民的所得成長，同時也為政策任務的執行者－地方鄉鎮政府的尋租行為打開方便之門。另外，中共在農村地區推行鄉村民主必須依靠地方鄉鎮政府的配合才能得以實施，但若完全實施村莊自治，將會導致鄉鎮政府執行中央強制任務和利己行為的高成本，因為民選的村幹部會抵制各種鄉鎮政府的稅費，以及質疑這些稅費的合法性。所以，就出現了鄉鎮政府利用各種機會和手段干預村莊自治的現象。對中央政府來說，在完成強制任務和實施關於村莊民主選舉的《村民委員會組織法》之間，中共中央顯然更偏好前者，由而中共會默許地方鄉鎮政府破壞《村民委員會組織法》的違法行為。本文認為，欲解決中國大陸基層民主困境和農民負擔加重等問題的關鍵，是中共如何調整自身的政策和放鬆，乃至解除各種強制性政策。

關鍵字

中國大陸；基層民主；強制政策；稅費負擔

並列摘要

This paper analyzes two main phenomena: the deterrence of the grass-root democracy and the enhancement of tax burdens in the rural areas of Mainland China. By means of a simple model, we find the resource of problems lies on the regulative policy of the state. On the one hand, the state implements various regulations in the rural areas, and carry a serious burden on the farmers. On the other hand, the government also boost grass-root democratization. The quandary presents: First of all, democratization maybe intimidate the legitimacy of various tax burdens. Secondly, the cadres of local government must carry out the central authority's policy. Under the circumstance of central authority preferring regulations, the local government have strong incentives to meddle with rural democratic transition, and the central will acquiesce this behavior. As far as we concerned, the various regulations must be abrogated in order to facilitate grass-root democracy and alleviate farms' tax burdens.