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  • 學位論文

鐵路地下化之政策形成過程與都市政權運作的分析 —以臺南市區鐵路地下化計畫為例

A case study of Tainan Railway Underground project: Decision-making processes of urban regime

指導教授 : 黃麗玲

摘要


本文以回顧鐵路立體化政策(地下化)的緣起,探討鐵路改建政策之利弊得失,並以臺南市區鐵路地下化一案作為案例研究標的。透過都市政權理論(Urban Regime Theory)作為分析方法與主要的理論對話對象,主要聚焦在地方都市政權中行動者的描繪。 傳統鐵路縱貫各城市之舊市區之核心區域,於1989年臺北市區鐵路地下化第一期工程完竣後,諸多城市的鐵路立體化計畫相繼推出,並成為政策之口號。唯其高昂的工程經費,多遇及計畫之延宕與更改,且傾向以周邊的土地再開發手段作為工程自償率的回饋機制,實務上造成了諸多爭議。本研究透過質性訪談法及次級資料的分析,佐證鐵路立體化對於市區交通改善、平衡區域發展的侷限性,與之帶給交通事業機構臺鐵局的負面衝擊。其中,臺南市鐵路地下化的工程設計變更、擴大徵收範圍的爭議,便是最佳的研究案例。透過戰後臺南市的歷史發展分析,本研究主張臺南都市問題的成因,在於都市計畫面對開發壓力的挫敗與放任都市持續擴張造成之舊市區的衰退、以私人運具優先的交通環境所造成。鐵路地下化並非解決臺南市城市問題的最佳政策,卻在都市政權的強勢運作之下,排除了政策討論的機會。 本研究的第二部分將結合都市政權理論與派系政治的觀點,描繪臺南市的都市政權如何被形塑,原應互斥的各方利益團體與派系,如何在本案中形成統理的聯盟。本研究在田野資料研究中,補充都市政權理論對應於臺灣的特質與現象:以政黨內的特定派系作為主導,對內貫穿黨中央與地方派系,運用產、官、學、媒的統理技術,鞏固了都市的政權。特定派系得以此為基礎,更進一步得以上脅中央,並逐步掌握國家的行政機器。仰賴著龐大的都市政權體系作為支持,臺南市鐵路地下化一案在爭議中通過、並開始執行相關工程與沿線土地開發。然而,這個現象卻對國家的財政負擔、社會的正義,帶來了不可抹滅的負面效果。

並列摘要


This thesis aims to use the “Urban Regime Theory” to analyze Tainan’s Railway Underground projects, with a focus on the decision-making process of the above controversial plan. Traditional railway route cut through every city center in Taiwan. Since 1989, the first Underground Project has been done in Taipei city. This infrastructure reconstruction policy has claimed to improve traffic issues, encourage urban renewal, and make development balanced nearby the railway area. However, the significant financial burden of building and maintaining the cost of the railway. In addition, some researchers pointed out that the railway may influence the operation of the TRA system because of the financial problem. The railway underground project tends to increase the ‘’Self-Liquidating Ratio’’ by developing land and privatization of public spaces nearby the railway area. However, the financial plans are rarely accurate, furthermore, they have forced eviction. Despite these problems, this project is still being widely promoted by local politicians. In the case of Tainan, the local urban regime is led by specific party faction governance with complex power and interest. By cooperating with bureaucracies, interest groups, media, professional communities, the specific party faction executed the project boldly. I conclude that this urban regime governance model would be averse to Tainan’s social justice and damaged the government's finance.

參考文獻


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