論我國農業金融體系之改革 及監控機制之建構

How to reform the system of agricultural finance in Taiwan and establish it’s corporate governance mechanism

黃錦源(Jin-Yuan Huang)

指導教授 ： 鄒翊 ； 簡俱揚

中原大學/商學院/會計研究所/碩士(2005年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu200500629

摘要

摘 要

自從民國八十四年中壢市農會發生擠兌以來，有如烽火燎原，全國各地農漁會曾發生數十起擠兌事件。我國基層農漁業金融體系長久以來被政治力操控，只重選舉不重經營，被掏空超貸，更被形容為黑金體系之現象，才引起農業及財經各界之重視。惟因主管機關權責劃分不清，平時政出多門，遇事互相推諉，政府公權力不彰之情形，已表露無遺。
政界與學界互相論戰，財金學者多持應事權統一，主張由財政部一元化管理，並從嚴從速清理。農經學者卻主張由行政院農業委員會以較保護農業之角度處理。政府原採從嚴管理，修改及訂定相關法律，啟動金融重建基金，由銀行概括承受四十四家調整後淨值為負數之基層金融機構，並持續依逾放比率分級管理，限制經營不良之農漁會各項業務。陳總統雖提出寧失政權也要改革之決心，惟仍不敵李前總統所謂政府要消滅農會及十二萬人大遊行之威力，政策因而大轉彎，幾乎全面妥協，接受農金體系之意見，制定農業金融法、成立全國農業金庫、建立以行政院農業委員會一元化管理之農業金融體系。
雖被定位為妥協下的法律，農業金融法卻有許多值得喝采的，例如全國農業金庫之獨立董事佔三分之一、獨立監察人及獨立授信審議委員佔二分之一，以及嚴刑峻罰之規定等。惟農漁會信用部之相關規定則顯寬容，全國農業金庫已經開業，二級制之農業金融體系已建構完成，一向主張保護農業之行政院農業委員會，有無能力；有無魄力；有無意願，做好監理工作，全國農業金庫將如何扮演上層金融機構之角色，將是各方矚目之焦點。
本論文第一章緒論大致說明我國之金融改革，金融問題及研究之出發點。第二章探討公司監控之意義及機制，並引述有關公司治理、代理理論、金融監理及農業金融之相關文獻。第三章為我國農業金融體系之背景及面臨之問題。第四章介紹日本之農金體系及其內外監控機制。第五章分析信用部逾放比率偏高之原因，並以觀音鄉農會及楊梅鎮農會之貸款弊案，檢討內部監控機制之無力與外部監控機制之延遲。第六章分析農業金融體系之內外監控機制，及一年多來行政院農業委員會依農業金融法訂定之各種辦法規章。第七章為結論與建議。
本研究發現，二元化之金融監理，將出現農委會對農金體系之監理比金融監督管理委員會對其他金融機構之監理較為寬鬆之現象，建議其應嚴格監理。並加速改革，恢復股金制以推動合併。訂定授信管理辦法，以兼顧競爭力與風險。強化金融預警制度及修法使退出市場機制能更早啟動等，以加強農業金融體系之監理。

關鍵字

分散貸款集中使用 ； 農業金融 ； 公司監控

並列摘要

Abstract

Ignited by the crashing run on the Farmer’s Association of Jhongli City in 1995, dozens of crashing run cases were ensued on farmer’s and fisherman’s associations island wide. By then, the rooted problems long existing in Taiwan’s grassroots farmer’s and fisherman’s financial system had finally drawn attention from the agricultural and financial circles. For a long time, Taiwan’s grassroots farmer’s and fisherman’s financial system had been controlled by the political force, so instead of well managing the organizations, election matters became the mainstay of those groups. As a result, it entailed defaults, such as properties being emptied out of those organizations or over-credited loans, and the organizations were therefore notorious for their black-gold phenomenon. However, due to the vague division for rights and obligations among the government’s competent authorities, it was easy for them to steer clear of their responsibilities and blame each other for mistakes. It fully illustrated the inefficiency of the execution of Government’s authorities.
The pundits in the political and academic circles also joined the battle to express their contentions against each other. Most financial academics contended that the affairs should be unified and the Ministry of Finance should lead the unified management to rapidly and strictly dispose this issue. Nevertheless, the agricultural economic academics thought this issue should be handled by the Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan in a manner to protect Taiwan’s agriculture. Initially, strict management was adopted by the Government. Relevant laws were modified and instituted, financial reconstruction fund was kicked off and 44 grassroots financial institutions with a negative post-adjusted net value were taken over by banks bearing all the rights and liabilities. The management continued to be made according to the grading of overdue loan ratio and the various businesses of the farmer’s and fisherman’s associations with bad business performance were restrained. Although President Chen brought up his reform resolution at the risk to lose his regime, yet defeated by the former President Lee who claimed the Government was going to eliminate farmer’s associations and led a large demonstration participated by more than 120,000 farmers, this policy blew out and turned over. The Government almost completely conceded to the agricultural economic system, enacted agriculture financial law, established a national agricultural vault, and built an agricultural financial system based on the unified management conducted by the Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan.
Even though it was positioned as a law of a compromise, the agricultural financial law has many merits for applause. For instance, independent board members take up 1/3 of the total board members in the national agricultural vault, independent supervisors and independent credit evaluation committee members also account for half of the total members, and stiff penalty is stipulated in the provisions. On the other hand, the provisions for the credit division of farmer’s and fisherman’s associations appear to be slack in comparison. While the national agricultural vault has been on the road and two-graded agricultural financial system has been accomplished, it will be the limelight to see if the Council of Agriculture that vowed to protect agriculture is competent, resolute and willing to do a good surveillance job and how the national agricultural vault plays its role as a qualified upper-level financial institution.
In the introduction of the first chapter of this paper, Taiwan’s financial reforms, financial issues and the motivation of this study have been roughly elucidated. In the second chapter, the meaning and mechanism of corporate governance have been probed and literature relating to corporate governance, agency theory, financial surveillance and agricultural finance has been referred. The third chapter has investigated the background of Taiwan’s agricultural financial system and the issues confronted. In the forth chapter, Japan’s agricultural financial system and its internal as well as external surveillance mechanism have been introduced. In the fifth chapter, the reasons for a higher rate of overdue loans in the credit division have been analyzed, and the loan fraud cases occurred at Guanyin County Farmer’s Association and Yungmei Township Farmer’s Associations have been used as the case study to review the incompetence of internal surveillance and the procrastination of external monitoring mechanism. In the sixth chapter, the internal and external surveillance mechanism of agricultural financial system, and the various regulations stipulated according to the agricultural financial law for the past year or so by the Council of Agriculture have been analyzed. Conclusions as well as recommendations have been made in Chapter 7.
This study suggested that dual financial surveillance would lead to looser surveillance of agricultural financial system watched by the Council of Agriculture than the surveillance of other financial institutions supervised by Taiwan Financial Supervisory Committee. Under such circumstances, we would recommend strict governance, rapid reform and recovery of share system so as to promote merger. In addition, credit management regulations shall be instituted so competitiveness and risks can be leveraged. Financial early warning system shall also be reinforced and the regulations shall be modified to prompt the withdrawal mechanism as early as possible, so as to fortify the surveillance of agriculture financial system.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； agricultural finance ； separating loans but central

參考文獻

17、 存款保險資訊季刊第十三卷第三期至第十八卷第一期﹝89年至94年3月各期﹞。

4、 林玉霞﹝2002﹞「台灣上市公司代理問題、公司治理與股東價值之研究」，中原大學會計研究所碩士論文，民國91年6月。

參考文獻 日文

1、石田信隆﹝2005﹞ 「垂直整合理論農協組織─企業比較通考─」農林金融2005.3。

2、栗栖祐子﹝2005﹞「平成16年第2回農協信用事業動向調查結果」農林金融2005.5。