行政法上強制揭露義務與不自證己罪權利之關係--以美國法為核心

The Administrative Obligation of Disclosure and the Right against Self-incrimination

蔡鎮宇(Chen-Yu Tsai)

指導教授 ： 王兆鵬

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.00214

摘要

不自證己罪權利乃現代法治國家普遍承認之普世人權。其來源最早可溯及舊約聖經，具有濃厚的自然法性質。一般認為，不自證己罪權利的起源，即是在對抗對抗職權宣誓制度時，援引此種此種與生俱來的自然權利，而誕生的。也因為此種來自於人類先天理性的性質，各現代法治國家無不將不自證己罪視為人民之基本人權加以保護。
所謂基本人權者，應受到憲法的絕對保障。基於憲法權利之最高性，憲法權利應該適用於任何國家之措施。不論國家是以何種形式侵害人民之憲法權利，只要實質上已經侵害到人民憲法權利之核心，該國家所為侵害即應為憲法所禁止。在這樣的想法之下，因為不自證己罪權利亦屬憲法基本人權，任何對不自證己罪權利之侵害亦應為憲法所禁止。
在行政法規領域中，政府賦予人民許多具有管制目的之強制揭露義務。此種強制揭露義務，通常係以罰鍰、罰金、自由刑等方式強迫人民為一定之報告、文件提出、回答一定之問題。雖然此種管制目的法規乍看之下與不自證己罪權利並無牽連，然而，在許多個案中，為了完成所謂的「管制目的」，必須犧牲人民之不自證己罪權利，例如我國道路交通管理處罰條例第六十二條關於肇事停留現場、通知警察之義務即為一例。然而，究竟何謂「管制目的」？「管制目的」可否與刑事目的完全區分？如何處理「管制目的」與「不自證己罪權利」之衝突？在在均充滿疑問。
本文參考不自證己罪權利案例、論述較豐富之美國聯邦最高法院諸多判決先例後，認為採取美國法上對於不自證己罪權利的五大要件：「自然人」、「受迫」、「供述」、「入罪資訊」、「針對自己」即可以有效的精確界定行政法領域中人民所應負之揭露義務。無須因為法規是否具有「管制目的」而有不同之對待。亦即，當人民在個案中受到政府強制，不論是刑事手段或是行政手段之強制，只要符合「自然人」、「受迫」、「供述」、「入罪資訊」、「針對自己」之情形，人民即可以主張拒絕服從政府。
或有認為，行政法強制揭露義務若允許人民以「有受刑事追訴之虞」為由拒絕履行，將會造成行政法上的自我報告系統崩潰。然而，根據上述的五大要件中的「供述要件」，文件提出義務將非不自證己罪權利適用之範圍。因此大多數的行政法強制揭露義務，例如證券交易法之公開揭露義務、公務員財產申報法之財產申報義務均非不自證己罪權利之適用範圍。只有少數行政法規要求人民為一定之意思傳達時，例如要求人民到行政機關備詢、要求人民通知警察機關，才會屬於上述「供述要件」之範圍，影響範圍本就不大。
此外，本文主張在人民以有「受刑事追訴之虞」為由拒絕報告的場合中，政府應得以賦予刑事豁免權的方式移除人民的入罪風險並強制人民揭露資訊。這裡所謂的刑事豁免權，並非指「衍生使用豁免權」，而是指本文所謂的「間接豁免權」—行政機關保證該強制取得之資訊不得流與刑事司法機關使用。在如此之刑事豁免權規定之下，即使人民已經在行政機關前供述入罪訊息，檢調機關事後仍能以獨立合法取得之證據追訴人民，檢方不用舉證推翻事後所取得之證據並非衍生證據。此種方式不僅可以有效人民自我入罪之風險，也不會過度侵害檢調機關刑事偵察的利益。
最後，既然採取「間接豁免權制度」是有助於管制目的之達成，而且對於刑事司法利益之侵害也極其有限，本文認為，應承認人民於面對行政法強制揭露義務之壓迫時，得主張不自證己罪權利，且不因行政法規具有正當之管制目的而有例外。故在行政法規規定強迫人民供述時，在政府未提供刑事豁免權之前，人民應得主張不自證己罪權利拒絕履行揭露義務。

關鍵字

不自證己罪 ； 緘默權 ； 揭露義務 ； 供述證據 ； 管制目的理論 ； 團體組織理論 ； 行政約詢 ； 行政調查 ； 刑事豁免權

並列摘要

The right against self-incrimination is a universal human right acknowledged in every modern country ruled by law. Its root can be traced back to the Bible, which has the nature of Natural Law. It is believed that the origin of the right against self-incrimination was to fight against the oath ex officio, and the oath ex officio was abolished because it infringed the natural human right (“freeborn right”). Owing to humans’ innate rationality, there is no modern country that does not recognize the right against self-incrimination as a basic human right.
Basic human rights should be unconditionally protected by the Constitution. Based on the supremacy of the Constitution, all measures taken by the government should not violate the Constitution. No matter how the government infringes people’s constitutional right, the infringement should be forbidden by the Constitution as long as it violates the core value of the constitutional right. Thus, since the right against self-incrimination is included in the Constitution, all kinds of infringement of the right against self-incrimination should also be forbidden.
In the field of administrative law, people are obligated to disclose information to fulfill the “regulatory purpose”. They are required to report, produce documents, and answer questions or they will be fined and imprisoned. Although “laws of regulatory purpose” are not directly related to the right against self-incrimination, this right must be sacrificed to the “regulatory purpose” in many cases such as the Hit and Run Statute. However, what is the “regulatory purpose” (or regulatory interest)? Is it possible to completely separate it from the criminal purpose? How do we deal with the conflict between them?
This thesis refers to the cases ruled by the United States Federal Supreme Court and argues that the five elements of the right against self-incrimination – No person, shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness, against himself – should be used to effectively define the obligation of disclosure in the field of administrative law, whether it has the regulatory purpose or not. In other words, people can invoke their right against self-incrimination to refuse to disclose incriminating information when they are asked to do so by the criminal law or administrative law.
Some may argue that the compulsory self-report system of the administrative law may totally fall apart if people are allowed to invoke the right against self-incrimination when they face the legal compulsion to disclose incriminating information. However, based on the element, “to be a witness”, mentioned above, the obligation to present documents will not be protected by the right against self-incrimination. Therefore, most conditions within the compulsory self-report scheme such as the disclosure obligation of finances in Security and Exchange Act or the property disclosure obligation of government officials are not affected by the right again self-incrimination. Only when the administrative law compels people to testify will the right against self-incrimination be involved. For example, people are requested to answer questions asked by the administrative agency or to notify the police of the automobile accident they involved, which only takes a small part.
In addition, this thesis argues that the administrative agency should grant immunity to remove the danger of self-incrimination and compel people to disclose information. The immunity suggested here is not “use and derivative use” immunity but “indirect immunity”, meaning the incriminating information obtained by the administrative agency must not be used by other prosecution-related agency. Under the circumstances, even if people have provided incriminating information for the administrative agency, the prosecution department can still prosecute people with the evidence obtained from legitimate sources wholly independent without proving that it is not derivative evidence. This way the danger of self-incrimination can be removed effectively and the right of investigation by the prosecution department will not be excessively violated.
Finally, since the “regulatory purpose” can be fulfilled and the damage to the interest of prosecuting criminals is almost invisible by granting indirect immunity, this thesis asserts that the right against self-incrimination can be invoked when people are under the legal compulsion of the administrative law to disclose information and there is no exception even if the government has a legitimate regulatory purpose. Therefore, in the circumstances that the administrative law compels people to serve as a witness, people should be allowed to invoke their right against self-incrimination to refuse to comply with the obligation until the government grants them indirect immunity.

並列關鍵字

Privilege against Self-Incrimination ； Right against Self-Incrimination ； Right to Remain Silence ； Obligation to Disclosure ； Testimonial Evidence ； Regulatory Purpose Doctrine ； Collective Entity Doctrine ； Administrative Investigation ； Immunity.

參考文獻

Jean-Michel, Sallmann著，馬振騁譯，女巫—撒旦的情人，時報文化，2002。

林鈺雄，刑事訴訟法（上冊），作者自版，2000.9，學林總經銷。

黃昭元，憲法權利限制的司法審查標準：美國類型化多元標準模式的比較分析，台大法學論叢第三十三卷第三期，2004.5。

何賴傑，告知義務與第三審上訴之限制，台灣本土法學雜誌第一期，1999.4。

林鈺雄，論不自證己罪原則，台大法學論叢第三十五卷第二期，2006.3。