經理人薪酬契約對盈餘管理行為之影響—以生命週期觀點

The Influence of Management Compensation Contracts on Earnings Management Behavior: a Business Lifecycle Perspective

劉振家(Zhien-Chia-Liu)

指導教授 ： 陳育成 ； 黃德舜

國立中正大學/管理學院/企業管理學系/博士(2011年)

摘要

相關文獻顯示經理人薪酬影響其盈餘操縱行為。但企業隨著不同生命週期設計薪酬結構(固定、變動薪酬)，因此其可能為了不同目的使盈餘管理行為產生差異性。本文旨在探討企業處於不同生命週期階段，經理人面對不同薪酬給付型態之盈餘管理行為，分析操縱前盈餘未達門檻(避免虧損、維持前期盈餘、符合分析師盈餘預測)，經理人為是否為了自身薪酬從事盈餘管理行為。本研究樣本為2003至2009年臺灣上市企業，以避免虧損、維持前期盈餘、符合分析師盈餘為門檻指標及存有控制股東與否、海外投資、規模、資訊透明度、財務危機、維護職位為控制變數，發現臺灣上市企業初始階段，避免虧損為盈餘管理主要方式，且經理人其變動薪酬與避免虧損之盈餘門檻具顯著負向關係。成長階段，符合分析師預測、維持前期盈餘為盈餘管理主要方式，但經理人其變動薪酬與避免虧損、維持前期盈餘、符合分析師盈餘預測之盈餘門檻皆未具顯著關係。成熟階段，維持前期盈餘亦為盈餘管理主要方式，經理人其變動薪酬卻僅與避免虧損之盈餘門檻具顯著負向關係。衰退階段則以避免虧損為盈餘管理主要方式，但經理人其變動薪酬與符合分析師盈餘預測之盈餘門檻具顯著負向關係。

關鍵字

裁決性應計項目 ； 盈餘管理 ； 盈餘門檻 ； 經理人變動薪酬

並列摘要

Management compensation often influences earnings manipulation. Enterprises may use different compensation structures (fixed or variable compensation) through their different life cycle stages. Such a variation may produce differentiation in earnings management behavior. This paper analyzes whether managers engage in earnings management behavior for the sake of their own benefits under different types of compensation structure when company earnings fail to meet thresholds (i.e. avoiding losses, avoiding earning decrease, and meeting analyst forecasts). Data were drawn from listed companies in Taiwan between 2003 and 2009. Variables are earnings thresholds such as avoiding losses, avoiding earning decrease, and meeting analyst forecasts, and there are control variables including the existence of control ownership, foreign investment, size, information transparency, financial distress, and avoiding manager replacement. Empirical results show that avoiding losses was the primary earnings management method at the start-up stage.The variable compensation of managers had a significant negative relationship with the earnings thresholds of avoiding losses. At the growth stage, avoiding earning decreases and meeting analyst forecasts were the primary method of earnings management. However, no significant relationship between the variable compensation of managers and avoiding losses, avoiding earning decreases, or meeting the analyst forecasts was found. During the maturity stage, the primary method of earnings management was avoiding earning decreases. However, managers’ variable compensation was significantly related to only avoiding losses.At the declining stage, the primary earnings management method was avoiding losses, and there was a significant negative relationship between managers’ variable compensation and meeting the analyst forecasts.

並列關鍵字

Discretionary accruals ； Earnings management ； Earnings thresholds ； Variable compensation

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