招生賽局：研究所入學考試的撞期分析

The Enrollment Game: Conflicting Entrance Examinations of Graduate Schools in Taiwan

高一誠(Yi-Cheng Kao) ； 林健暉(Chien-Hui Lin)

《經濟論文叢刊》 45卷3期 (2017/09) Pp. 495-513

https://doi.org/10.6277/TER.2017.453.4

摘要

國內研究所入學考試每年均發生撞期事件，若將學校分為頂尖大學、一般大學與技職院校等三類型，則實際資料顯示不同類型學校間考期有錯開的趨勢。本文針對此現象建構賽局模型加以解釋，發現當考試結果具有不確定性，出現能力最佳學生不一定考最高而程度最差學生不一定考最低之衡量誤差，則學生報考學校組合會有策略性考量。考期錯開現象是不同類型學校間競爭好學生的均衡結果。另外，當考試結果之不確定性隨時間增加，頂尖學校會提早考試以降低衡量誤差，來提高錄取能力最佳學生的機率。

關鍵字

招生機制 ； 日期決策競爭 ； 頂尖大學

並列摘要

Concerning the entrance mechanism of graduate schools in Taiwan, the conflict of examination dates has been a crucial issue over the years. In particular, top, middle, and lower universities cluster their examinations during February, March, and April, respectively. In this paper, we developed a model to explain this phenomenon of diverging dates. The model shows that when the examination exhibits measurement error, i.e., the best (worst) student may not have the highest (lowest) testing scores, the phenomenon is an equilibrium among universities competing for better students. Specifically, when the measurement error increases, a top university will have an earlier examination to decrease the error and raise the probability of enrolling best students.

並列關鍵字

entrance mechanism of graduate schools ； competition in time ； top universities

參考文獻

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