經理人之股份基礎給付對穩健原則之影響

Executives’ Equity-Based Compensation and Accounting Conservatism

楊于萱(Yu-Hsuan Yang)

指導教授 ： 劉啟群

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.00458

摘要

本篇論文研究目的是探討經理人的權益薪酬比例與公司會計穩健原則之關係。當公司所有權與經營權分離時，股東與經理人會因資訊不對稱而有代理問題產生，而給予經理人股票選擇權及限制性股票這類權益薪酬，目的是為了連結雙方的利益，激勵經理人以公司的利益為主要考量，進而減緩代理問題;穩健會計就Watts契約面解釋而言，認為它能限制經理人的行為，是為了解決因資訊不對稱、有限期間與有限責任所導致的道德危機，而發展出的一種有效率的機制，可藉由認列損失與利得時存在的不對稱時效性來降低代理成本，所以我預期經理人的權益薪酬比例與穩健會計間存在負向關係。
實證研究以美國公司為樣本，採用Basu模型，以盈餘對好（壞）消息之不對稱反應來衡量會計穩健原則，1993-2012年間證實隨著權益薪酬比例的增加會降低對穩健原則的需求。本研究進一步將樣本分為四個期間: 1993-2001, 2003-2005, 2006-2008, 2009-2012，其中，2003-2005及2006-2008之實證結果亦符合預期，惟1993-2001與2009-2012，其實證結果之方向雖與預期一致，但不顯著，可能受該期間有關薪酬之會計制度及股票大盤走勢的影響。最後，各期間經敏感性測試所得到的實證結果仍不變。

關鍵字

經理人之權益薪酬 ； 會計穩健原則 ； 不對稱時效性 ； 代理問題

並列摘要

This paper examines the relation between executives’ equity-based compensation and accounting conservatism. Since both mechanisms may mitigate the agency problems between managers and shareholders, I hypothesize that there is a negative relation between the proportion of equity-based compensation to executives and the level of conservatism. Using a large sample of US firms during the period 1993-2012, I find that the coefficient of interaction on the ratio of executives’ equity-based to total compensation and accounting conservatism is negative and significant. Further, I divide the whole sample period into four parts: 1993-2001, 2003-2005, 2006-2008, and 2009-2012. The results of period 2003-2005 and 2006-2008 are consistent with my hypothesis: the asymmetric timeliness of earnings declines with managerial proportion of executives’ equity-based compensation. However, the outcomes of period 1993-2001 and 2009-2012 are negative but not significant. The reason might be that accounting standard at that time is associated with adoption and shareholders’ understanding of managers’ incentives plan. Besides, the trend of stock market may bring about an unobvious effect. The results are robust after controlling for the investment opportunity set and additional tests.

並列關鍵字

executives’ equity-based compensation ； accounting conservatism ； asymmetric timeliness ； agency problem

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