環境爭議性公共設施的回饋制度：對核一廠、核二廠及台中火力發電廠的分析

The Compensating Institution of Public Facilities for Nimby Syndrome : The Case Studies of Nuclear and Thermal Power Plants in Taiwan

王怡文(Yi-Wen Wang) ； 蕭新煌(Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao)

《都市與計劃》 31卷1期 (2004/03) Pp. 65-90

摘要

台灣面對環境爭議性公共設施計畫造成的鄰避徵候，是以制度性的回饋方式作為解決策略，設置「電源開發基金委員會」，其政策目標在於增進地方福祉，並彌補所在地居民的損失，但是回饋機制是否合理適切？是否能達成回饋的政策目標？是本文關注的焦點。首先以爭議性公共設施回饋的理論為基礎，提出探討的分析架構，分成兩大部分，其一是以開發業者因公共設施興建導致的負面外溢效果與環境影響，對所在地居民造成的損害有彌補之職責；另一部分，所在地居民因特別犧牲或損害，所接受的補償(含補償方式)是否能符合多數人的期望。
根據此一分析架構，以電力設施為研究對象，選取歷史久遠於七○年代即開始商轉的核能一廠、核能二廠，及九○年代開始商轉的台中火力發電廠為回饋制度的分析個案，研究設計係根據分析架構以訪談與問卷為主要方式，透過實驗組與對照組的研究設計，根據系統隨機抽樣的1,557份有效問卷的結果，對回饋制度運作影響進行分析、評估與解釋。
由調查資料與田野訪談經驗中，發現許多台灣執行回饋制度過程中的特殊現象，研究者並嘗試對發現進行可能的理論描述，提出如：傷痕認同等概念，並論述回饋制度調整的必要性，適逢台灣的回饋制度面臨變革，九十二年度電力設施回饋的財源「電源開發基金」將由獨立非營業基金的委員會型態，回歸由開發業者之台電統籌管理，因此，在策略上宜由制度重新討論的角度出發，本研究結果與發現可作為檢討回饋制度之參考根據。

關鍵字

鄰避徵候 ； 回饋制度 ； 電力設施 ； 外溢效果 ； 環境影響

並列摘要

The NIMBY syndrome, giving rise to environmental conflicts and disputes, has been considered a dilemma for government to locate public facilities. Facing this dilemma, the Taiwanese government has adopted a strategy of institutional compensation for the local residents as they sacrifice for public interests. Specifically, the Taiwanese government established “The Power Development Foundation (PDF)” in order to enhance the welfare of local communities and promote local economic development. In this paper, we will evaluate the processes and impacts of institutional compensation in detail in terms of the public policy goals set forth by the government.
First, we base the analytical framework on the compensating theory. The framework looks into the responsibilities of developers who are considered as causing negative environmental spillover effects for the sake of constructing public facilities. These responsibilities often include suitable compensating mechanism, effective information delivery, and satisfactory outcomes of compensating. Also, the framework examines institutional compensation to see if it meets the expectation of the local majority population.
Second, we focus the research on power plants since this type of Nimby facilities was extremely diverse in nature. Three power plants are selected, including two nuclear plants in northern Taiwan and one thermal power plant in Taichung. Samples were drawn from local residents near the three power plants as the experimental group and non-residents as the comparison group. Several interesting results are observed in the 1,557 valid responses, such as ”scar identity effect” et al.
Finally, based on the results of our questionnaires and field studies, we observed that institutional compensation could cause both positive and negative effects by involving interest groups and monetary compensation. On one hand, the subsidy funds could improve local public facilities. On the other hand, vast monetary resource controlled by few local officials not only makes negative impressions on local residents, but also cause corruption from personal interests and profits and therefore turmoil in local government. The unintentional outcomes of institutional compensation prompt us to make needed reforms. The finding of this research could be used as a basis for future evaluation and reforming the system for the policy makers.

並列關鍵字

Nimby syndrome,institutional compensation ； public facility ； environmental spillover effects

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