論高達美與後期維根斯坦哲學中語言與實在的關係

On Language and Reality in Gadamer and the Later Wittgenstein

陶嘉代(Jia-Dai Tau)

指導教授 ： 陳榮華

共同指導教授 ： 楊金穆

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/博士(2012年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2012.10455

摘要

語言與實在的關係是哲學研究的基礎，對語言與實在關係的哲學研究則具體落實哲學不遺漏自身基礎之深入反省的目標。本文主要根據《真理與方法》與《論確定性》，評析高達美與後期維根斯坦對此議題的可能貢獻。為了對這兩位哲學背景、用字譴詞與論述風格迥異的哲學家作出公允的比較，本文強調把握他們哲學取向的重要性。哲學取向是哲學家使用其哲學論述的方式，而這決定其哲學論述的確切意義。為此，本文採取以下論述方式：首先致力於從《真理與方法》與《論確定性》各自處理的哲學問題與處理方式分別握他們的哲學取向，繼而貼合著他們各自的哲學取向來探查《真理與方法》與《論確定性》對於本文論題的可能貢獻，最後才以本文論題為中心對於這些貢獻進行直接比較。
經由以上論述方式，本文研究結果如下：《真理與方法》在理論式哲學取向下，對於本文論題提出的貢獻是---語言與實在在問與答的對話中，具有原初的統一或一致性關係。《論確定性》在治療式哲學取向下，對於本文論題提出的貢獻是---語言與實在在客觀確信的語言行為或實踐中，具有原初的統一或一致性關係。《真理與方法》與《論確定性》對於本文論題的共同主論點是：語言與實在具有原初的統一關係；亦即語言本身是夠好的，能夠向我們呈現或開顯出實在。在此共同主論點下，他們的一個共同關切或目標是：在語言使用上，向本身夠好的語言盡可能地保持開放與不獨斷。本文認為，相較於《真理與方法》在理論式哲學取向下所提出的問與答的對話，《論確定性》在治療式哲學取向下提出的客觀確信的語言行為或實踐，較能具體落實此共同關切。

關鍵字

高達美 ； 後期維根斯坦 ； 語言 ； 實在 ； 哲學

並列摘要

The relationship between language and reality is a fundamental issue in philosophy. This dissertation tries to analyze and compare Gadamer’s and the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical contributions on this issue. The main reference in this study is composed of two important works of them: Truth and Method and On Certainty. Since these two philosophies are diverse in academic background, vocabularies and style, it turns out to be important to grasp their philosophical approaches which, I think, serve as the foundations of their philosophies. My research method is a three-step process, (i) by an investigation of Truth and Method and On Certainty, to define their philosophical approaches by way of an analysis on the fundamental questions they deal with, and the responses they maintain. (ii), I examine their philosophical contributions in the thesis of the relationship between of language and reality. (iii), I give a comparison of their contributions.
The findings underline that Gadamer’s philosophical approach is theoretical, and that of later Wittgenstein is therapeutic. The former approach justifies that: in the dialogue of questions and answers, language and reality are in a primordial unity; while the latter justifies that: in the objective certainty of linguistic practice, language and reality are in a primordial unity. Their common conclusion is: language and reality are in a primordial unity, i.e., language is good enough to disclose reality to us. According to this conclusion their common concern would be: to keep open and undogmatic as far as possible in the use of language. In my conclusion I argue that, in contrast to Gadamer’s theoretical approach of dialogue of question and answer, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach of linguistic practice is more satisfactory in the working out of their common concern.

並列關鍵字

Gadamer ； later Wittgenstein ； language ； reality ； philosophy

參考文獻

------- (1983). Wittgenstein, Meaning and Understanding: essays on the Philosophical Investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bernstein, R. J. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: science, hermeneutics, and praxis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Cavell, S. (1976). Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

------- (2006). A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, trans. I. Maclean. New York: Oxford University Press.

------- (2002). Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution : the question of linguistic idealism. New York: Palgrave.