透過您的圖書館登入
IP:18.218.172.249
  • 學位論文

公司治理、高階經理人超額薪酬與公司績效間的關聯性

Relationship between Corporate Governance, CEO Excess Compensation and Firm Performance

指導教授 : 陳業寧
若您是本文的作者,可授權文章由華藝線上圖書館中協助推廣。

摘要


本文目的在於研究公司治理對於『超額薪酬與公司績效之連結性』的影響。以台灣1996-2007年上市櫃公司之總經理酬勞資料做為研究對象,發現在董事會持股百分比越高的情況下,超額薪酬與公司績效之間呈現正向相關;然而若經理人對於薪酬訂定過程具有影響力(經理人持股百分比越高及董事身兼經理人百分比越高),則超額薪酬與公司績效之間呈現負向連結。

並列摘要


The purpose of this article is to deal with the problem of how corporate governance will affect “the relationship between of excess compensation and firm performance.” Companies listed in TSE and OTC from 1996 to 2007 are included in the sample data. And we find that when board holding percentage is higher, the excess compensation and firm performance are positively correlated, vice versa. Also, when managers have some control over the process of compensation determination, the excess compensation and firm performance are negatively correlated, and vice versa.

參考文獻


林純瓊. 1994. 股權結構、資本結構與經營績效─Jensen、Meckling與Fama理論之驗證. 中國財務學刊. 1994年, 頁 3-20.
林淑惠、胡星陽. 2003. 上市公司高階經理人之酬勞結構. 經濟論文. 2003年, 頁 171-206.
洪玉舜、王泰昌. 2005. 績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要性. 證券市場發展. 2005年, 頁 35-100.
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C. and Starks, L. T. 2004. Conflicts of Interest and Monitoring Costs of Institutional Investors:. s.l. : Working Paper, University of Texus, 2004.
Baber, W., Janakiraman, S. and Kang, S. 1996. Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 1996, pp. 297-318.

延伸閱讀